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Good morning, my name is Anthony Sebok and I will be the
moderator for today's round table. Our first order of business is an
introduction by Dean Joan Wexler. Thank-you.
Dean Joan Wexler
Thank-you. Welcome to our round table to discuss Judge Jack
Weinstein, Tort Litigation & the Public Good. I am delighted to
see all of you here to help us honor this important figure in
American law on his eightieth birthday.
Federal judges have always held a special place in American
society. It was because of the respect and appreciation of their
power that our founders hotly debated the scope of the powers of
the federal courts under the Constitution. A popular view of federal
judges is that they help defend the individual against the state. This
is certainly one of their most important and visible tasks.
Another role federal judges play is that of helping the
individual achieve justice in a world filled with large institutions,
bureaucracies, and corporations. This is a task that federal judges
share with their state colleagues. It is, however, one which the
federal courts have taken up with increasing vigor and creativity in
the past thirty-five years. Judge Weinstein's birthday provides us
with an opportunity to look at tort litigation's new role as a tool for
individual justice in the federal courts. Judge Weinstein has a
unique perspective on this development, partly because of his long
experience on the federal bench and partly because of his
extraordinary insights into the historical changes that he has seen.
Since he was appointed to the Federal Bench by President
Johnson in 1967, he has witnessed major changes in procedure, the
Rules of Evidence, and substantive tort doctrine. During his tenure,
there have been at a least two revolutions in the law concerning
federal class actions. In the 1960s a tort suit involving one hundred
common plaintiffs would have been considered exceptional.
Today, Judge Weinstein is presiding over a case involving every
smoker in America. Similar sea changes have occurred in the law
concerning expert testimony and strict liability.
Judge Weinstein has kept a watchful eye on these changes of
the past decades. Sometimes, he was at the vanguard leading them.
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Sometimes, he penned cautionary critiques. Throughout his career,
his scholarly opinions and courtroom statements have always kept
one goal in mind: to help preserve the dignity of the individual in a
world of increasingly massive torts.
At today's round table, we hope to show Judge Weinstein how
much we appreciate his efforts by asking him and ourselves about
where we should go next. Are the models of class action in private
contingency fee litigation still practical in today's world? Is it even
sensible to try to maintain the aspiration of individual justice in an
era where tort litigation is openly embraced as a substitute for
legislation? Can we afford individual justice or full compensation
in suits that take up increasingly larger plaintiff classes and
increasing intractable theories of causation?
Although we certainly won't be able to answer these questions
today, I know that our discussants will openly and honestly address
them. I am very pleased that we have such a distinguished group
with us.
I now would like to turn the proceedings over to Professor
Tony Sebok, who conceived the program and organized it and
really worked very hard to bring all of you together. Among
Tony's many talents, he has an abiding interest in complex tort law
issues. He is a well-known scholar who has even opined about a
number of Jack Weinstein's ideas. Tony.
Moderator
Thank-you. Thank-you, very much, Dean Wexler.
When the idea for this round table last spring was first
discussed, at that point it was a law professor's dream to be able to
sit at a table with so many important figures of my living history.
And in that sense, it still is a great pleasure for me to be here. And
I am really grateful that you have agreed to come to Brooklyn Law
School to help us honor Jack Weinstein.
But on September 1 1th, the questions that we are going to
discuss took on a new meaning, both at a level of national but also
intellectual salience. After the events of September 11 th, I spoke to
the judge about the planning of this round table, I turned back to
certain writings. Judge Weinstein is not only a powerful figure for
the people who appear before him, he is also a powerful
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intellectual figure-bridging practice and theory.
I picked Individual Justice in Mass Tort Litigation, which is a
collection of law review articles published in 1995.1 I looked at a
chapter in which Jack Weinstein talks about an idea which now I
think is very pressing: He talks about the need to create something
called the "National Disaster Court" and why the federal
government and the states should accept such an institution.
A "National Disaster Court" would be an institution designed
to handle mass disastrous events in which thousands of people are
injured and killed. Judge Weinstein tried to offer a characterization
of the features and virtues of such a court. And I want today to
remind the judge of the seven things that he recommended such a
court should possess.
I believe the article, the chapter comes from an article
2published in 1986. The seven criteria are: First, that there should
be a concentration of decision making into the hands of one judge
or a handful of judges (but I think in his mind really one judge is
the best). Second, that the one judge should be in a single forum
where legal and factual issues can be decided, and decided finally.
Third, there should be a single substantive law. Fourth, that there
should be adequate judicial support facilities, so that the judge can
actually make binding factual and legal determinations. Fifth, that
there should be, in his mind, a reasonable fact-finding process
grounded on the adequate funding. Sixth, Judge Weinstein
suggests at different points in the book either caps or limitations or
elimination of pain and suffering damages and punitive damages.
Seventh and finally, he recommends-and this I thought was the
most interesting impression part-that there should be a single
distribution plan and I quote here, "with fairly and flexible
scheduled payments. '" 3
Now, later in the book, in a chapter called "The Future" the
See generally JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT
LITIGATION: THE EFFECT OF CLASS ACTIONS, CONSOLIDATIONS, AND OTHER
MULIPARTY DEVICES (1995).
2 See generally Jack. B. Weinstein, Preliminary Reflections in the Law's
Reaction to Disasters, 11 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. I (1986).
3 WEINSTEIN, supra note 1, at 4.
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judge cautions the reader. However we handle mass disasters, he
maintained at that time-and these words are his words-a
"suspicion of administrative systems."4 Now, when you put these
two chapters together, you see an approach to mass disasters at the
center of which is a strong judge. And that's no surprise, because
Judge Weinstein is a strong judge.
I think that that is an option which this country could continue
to embrace. But in the articles that I sent out to the participants of
this Roundtable at the Judge's urging, there is a new turn, in his
more recent pieces. 5 There is an open invitation for coordination
between the judge in the courtroom with the private litigants and
government actors, either through administrative law or criminal
law.
And so I detect a subtle change in Judge Weinstein's approach
to mass disasters, where now the role of the state is not necessarily
one which he treats with suspicion, but one in which there should
be a partnership. I think that after September 11, we have seen, in
fact, there have been attempts at a partnership between the federal
government, private attorneys, and the Southern District of New
York in dealing with the events of the World Trade Center attack.
So, I want to provoke this group into talking about the ideas
that underpin this vision of how we should handle mass disasters,
as well as asking questions about the role of mass tort law as
public law, and about how we can integrate actors outside of the
private bar into the mass torts process.
One issue I want to raise concerns the fact that whether by
design or by accident, America is viewed around the world as
having developed a certain model for handling mass delicts or
mass torts, and that includes a strong court, that is, a strong single
judge in partnership with an active plaintiffs' bar pursuing justice.
And I wonder whether or not that model is still workable. I also
wonder whether or not the rest of the world should look at that
model as our model or whether or not we have evolved past it.
4 Id. at 169.
5 See Jack B. Weinstein, Compensation for Mass Private Delicts: Evolving
Roles of Administrative, Criminal, and Tort Law, 2001 U. ILL. L. REv. 947
(2001).
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When facing mass torts today, the creative strong judge and the
private bar must let in other actors, and the question is whether this
should be done openly and explicitly. That's my suggestion. I
know you have all come here with many other ideas.
I want to talk a little bit about the proceedings today. Today's
event is a bit of an experiment. I have not participated in too many
conferences or academic activities that are not structured by people
presenting papers in a static format. And I really hope that after I
stop speaking, you won't hear my voice very much again. I hope to
hear all of your voices.
The way I hope to structure it is the following: Many of you
have agreed in consultation with me to prepare short five minute
reaction pieces to the article that I sent out. I am going to ask those
of you to present them in order one after another. And that should
take up, really, less than twenty-five minutes or so.
And then we have another hour for each session to talk to each
other. And the only thing I ask of you is to cooperate with me,
because I will need to organize people's comments. And the way I
would like to do it, with your permission, is when you want to say
something, just raise your hand or finger and we will make eye
contact, I will write your name down and I will call on you. I may,
however, and this is the one little variation, I may exercise a bit of
moderator's privilege of asking a certain individual to speak on a
certain point if I think it is especially relevant. I think with good
will and cooperation this could be a lot of fun.
Finally, I would like to say thank-you to a number of people. I
would to say thank-you, first of all, to Dean Wexler for supporting
this idea, helping me develop it. I would like to thank Diana
Nardone for helping to organize the entire round table, June Seddo
for helping us make it possible today, especially the set-up and the
lunch later on. My secretary, who was very, very helpful and
finally my colleagues, some of whom are sitting at this table and
many of whom are sitting in the audience, without whom my
education in both tort law and social issues would be far less rich.
The final person I want to thank is Jack Weinstein for agreeing
to do this. Thank-you, very much, Jack.
Okay, now, without further ado, I would like to begin. Sheila
Birnbaum, please begin.
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Ms. Birnbaum
It is a great pleasure to be here this morning with so many of
my colleagues from the plaintiffs' bar, academia, and the defense
bar. I thank everyone, especially the dean for this opportunity to
speak about the thoughts of Jack Weinstein, who I know we all
respect greatly.
I have not read the piece in a long time that you mentioned,
Tony, on the National Disaster Court. And I think I am going to go
back and do that, because I think it has taken on, perhaps, new
meaning and new possibilities.
I think one of the things that we have all seen in mass torts is
the filing at an early stage in a litigation numerous overlapping
class actions in the state and federal courts. And there has been no
way to consolidate all of these cases together. Although you can
multi-district the federal cases, there is no way, except through an
informal cooperation between state and federal judges. Some
judges may cooperate, and others will not cooperate.
And the cost and expense of this kind of mass repeating,
overlapping cases, all over the country, is enormous. It is a total
waste of resources and money that can be better used if there is a
real problem to provide compensation to real victims and not
compensation to those who are not injured.
In part, a nationalization of the kinds of occurrences like the
September 1 lth disaster is possible, but most dispersed types of
mass torts that we deal with every day, from a drug or device recall
to other product cases may be better handled in a centralized
location with a strong judge.
I think the issue of a single law applying to dispersed mass tort
creates a very difficult issue. I believe Professor Twerski may have
some comments on the issue as a conflicts expert. But the creation
of a national disaster court may be an idea whose time has come.
With regard to the cooperation between administrators and the
plaintiffs' bar and the courts, I am more skeptical than maybe
Judge Weinstein was many years ago. I think that when you take
attorney generals who are quite political and put them in the arena
of trying to affect tort law, you can create an unholy alliance that
shapes tort law in a negative way.
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I think one of the problems with attorney generals participating
in the cigarette litigation was even though they may have received
a great deal of money from the cigarette companies to avoid trial,
all of that money has not been used to affect anti-smoking
campaigns or cancer research. Just a small amount of the
settlement has been used to prevent tobacco related injuries or
effects.
So, I think that that attorney general litigation model is not a
very good model. I think the gun litigations is an example of tort
litigation that should not have been brought by the government
entities. Many of those cases have already been dismissed.
So, I do have a healthy skepticism of administrative and tort
law coming together.




Thank-you. I noticed this morning the program, this first
section, has a very benign title. I mean, class actions as a
mechanism for turning torts into public law.
To really make the panel provocative, we should take out the
phrase "class action" and insert Judge Weinstein. Take out
"mechanism" and put "force." Judge Weinstein as a force for
turning torts into public law.
Here is the formula. Here is the menu as to how he does it,
because I have worked with him.
First, he takes arcane civil procedure: jurisdiction, choice of
law, the rules of evidence. And he knows it so well that he fashions
an argument that breathes life into Rule 23. He is willing to
construe and interpret in a way like single choice of law, national
consensus law. My students ask, "Who thought it up, I mean,
where did it come from?" And Judge Weinstein fashions it in a
way that makes for a relatively credible convincing argument. You
can agree or disagree, but it is a force to be reckoned with. That's
step one.
The second thing he does to make the tort "public" is to
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publicize and widen the scope and impact of his rulings. He will
hold public hearing after public hearing, inviting people from all
over the nation to come and testify. He will reach out to the public
and meet with individual litigants urging them to accept or not
accept a proposal-but actually reach out and invite individual
litigants to meet with him, to talk about the case. He will provide
concepts like administrative appeals within his settlement, so that a
litigant will get a second opportunity to be heard. If you don't like
the initial result there is a person available to hear your appeal. He
will coordinate with Judge Freedman and others, in state and
federal cases, all designed to promote a wider distribution of the
meaning of his ruling than would otherwise be the case.
That is how he makes tort law public. Now, I conclude, there is
a pro and a con to this. I conclude that at the end of the day, class
actions as a device to make tort law public can be attributable to
Judge Weinstein's competence and his philosophy of judging.
That's really what it comes out to. I wonder whether forty
years from now, when the judge steps down, I wonder whether
there will be much lasting impact in terms of some of this.
When I go around the country, and I argue in favor of this
approach, the constant response I get is not criticism of Judge
Weinstein. Never that. What I hear in response is, well, that's
Judge Weinstein. I mean, put an asterisk, he is sui generis. What
about the other federal judges? What about state judges? Certainly
you can't expect this from anybody but Judge Weinstein. To me
that is a tribute to Judge Weinstein, but there is a question mark as
to what it all means in the not so long term.
Moderator
Thank-you. Let's turn to a judge. Judge Freedman.
Judge Freedman
I guess I am again in the position of being the class
representative for the entire state court judiciary. Because the
penchant among law professors is to look at federal cases, among
people who write to look at the federal cases, and yet, as Sheila
Birnbaum alluded to the fact, that most torts, most mass torts or
every other kind of torts start in state courts and for the most part
HONORING JUDGE WEINSTEIN




Yes. And that's where the problem is. Because, in part, we
have, we are stuck with this federalism that our founding fathers
thought was important. And I guess maybe even the mothers too.
And it hasn't really changed except by force of the personality of
someone like Judge Weinstein who called when we were working
on asbestos cases together, and we worked together on them. And I
think that's probably why I am invited here.
But that model was followed by the other MDL judges who got
the mass torts afterwards. Judge Pointer called all the state judges
he could find who had breast implant cases. Judge Bechtel called
all the state judges he could find who had Fen-Phen cases and told
us we better follow his model or else. It didn't work for him
totally. We had Judge Ludwig now on the latex glove cases, I have
them all. We have Judge Kaplan on the Rezlin cases, and these are
the ones at least that I have, that I have been working with these
judges.
And it is an interesting issue: how do we take the federal and
state cases and bring them together. Someone like Judge Weinstein
who certifies a class may be able to do it in part. But just another
example that you may not know about, I have something called the
Salzer hip cases. They are the hip implants that failed. I've got all
the New York cases.
Well, just on the day after all the cases, I got the administrative
order putting them all before me in the State of New York, not for
class action but for coordinated management, the so-called MDL in
New York State, I got a stay from Judge O'Malley who is the
Northern District of Ohio Judge, MDL Judge. She had certified a
class. So I said, well, we will stay the cases, it is a national class, I
don't see any reason why state class should be different despite
what the plaintiffs lawyer said, and then the Sixth Circuit vacated
that class certification or stayed it. And now I am in the position,
do I go ahead, or do I wait for the Sixth Circuit to make its final
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Well, I have decided to at least hold off for a little bit, but there
are a couple of judges in California who are pulling ahead from
what I understand. And there is the fear that this all yields, that the
money goes to the people in California who may get the big
verdicts. That's one of the problems we have with this kind of
hybrid state-federal system that we are dealing with.
Now, the mass disaster court, I think would be an interesting
way of resolving that, but when do we have a mass disaster? When
do we know we have a mass disaster? Well, September 11 th we
know we had mass disaster. Do we have a mass disaster with the
filing of the first asbestos case? Probably not. By the time the
fiftieth is filed, do we have one or do we not? Is it a real mass
disaster or is it a series of disasters? So these are some of the
questions I would like to ask Judge Weinstein: when do we have a
mass disaster?
When does coordination become beneficial and when does it
become a block? For example, I may coordinate with the federal
judges who are handling the cases and we try to establish a rational
way of proceeding, but some judge in West Virginia is going to
consolidate all the state cases in West Virginia, a huge settlement
is going to take place, and there will be no money left for the New
York plaintiffs. And that has happened in the asbestos litigation-
one settlement consumes huge resources-and caused a number of
companies to go into bankruptcy.
I have decided that there is no such thing as punitive damages
in New York asbestos cases, but my Texas counterparts have not
agreed with me. The federal judge has agreed and so it is now, I
think, attorney malpractice to file a case in federal court for a
plaintiffs lawyer anyway. So we are running into some of these
state and federal problems that seem insurmountable.
I think the conflict of the laws issues that we heard about
earlier, and that always seem to be invoked as a problem are
probably less significant than the local political factors that
motivated our founding fathers and mothers to establish the federal
system.
Just one other point, and I am kind of rambling a little but,
interestingly, I think some of the administrative actions have
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inadvertently been the source of some of the mass torts. For
example, breast implant litigation started after David Kessler of the
FDA made a big issue about them and asked companies to cease
manufacture. I think that happened with Fen-Phen to some extent
also. When the FDA makes a ruling, that's when the tort lawyers
jump in. So, while working together might be interesting, federal
government might also be constrained in its mission because of
fear of mass torts.
Moderator
Thank-you, very much. Mr. Rheingold.
Mr. Rheingold
Thanks. I have a little fable about Jack and the Beanstalk, and
the beanstalk is mass torts. And I have been an observer of Jack
and a participant in his court for about thirty years now.
I think the issue that many of us are raising directly or
indirectly is: if mass torts is this horrible beanstalk with a giant at
the top, how to handle it. And Jack we would put way out at one
end, fortunately, as someone who has felt his obligation is to tame
this beast, the giant, and hack down the whole stalk. That's for
good and for bad. I think we are all bringing out, something is
necessary to tame this beast, but the question is how far do you go.
My book on mass tort litigation6 I dedicated to Jack as a
proactive managerial judge. In fact, the first to really try and get
into this beanstalk, this big forest and do something about
controlling the cases. But at the same time, the subtitle of my book
"Rough Justice." And I recognize that any method of settling
claims of one hundred thousand people expediently, whether it is
one court or a few courts, results in claims of rough justice.
The question is, how far do we go in the name of trying to
bring order to these cases? And what any of us might think is a
greater good; Jack certainly sees the greater good. Can a federal
judge overuse the powers that are inherent in the position to maybe
not only kind of solve the problem but also hack down the whole
beanstalk?
6 PAUL D. RHEINGOLD, MASS TORT LITIGATION (1996).
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So, I would say to Jack, you are the paragon of rough justice
and I think there is no other solution than this. I think we are all
talking about problems that exist, but there are real time problems
that have to be attacked by proactive judges.
And as far as what Kenny said, I do think the judge has been
and will remain a model for how to do this: as a cautionary model
and, much more importantly, a positive model. Younger judges are
always saying to me in federal court, well, Judge Weinstein did
that. And I think it emboldens younger, less experienced mass tort
judges who get assigned a case that there has got to be. some way
through innovation and through clever ideas to deal with, not
draconian, but creative ideas. And I think Jack is a paragon of-I
won't say warping the law, but let's say just-bending just enough
to get to the point where the parties want to resolve their case.
And, after all, if there is a resolution, that's what the judge is
about.
Three of Jack's methods are: First, the state-federal
coordination-and far from, I think, there being a national crisis
where we've got to have one judge for everything or trust in one
judge-just what Judge Freedman here has pointed out to all of us,
works: that the state and federal judges can work together. There
were hundreds of thousands of Fen-Phen diet pill cases, but they
were handled with economy, and not at all the disaster people
thought there would be.
The second thing that I would praise the judge for-and he has
brought to our attention-is that even though you have a class of
one hundred thousand or one million people, it is still composed of
individuals. We as lawyers might just see numbers and disposition
rates. But Jack has forced us to realize that each person is injured
and he or she has her own claim. And I think Jack has gone further
than anyone in bringing in these people. He brought in the DES
claimant and said, what does this mean to you, what are your fears,
what are your goals? And it gives these people a feeling that they
had their day in court. They know they are numbers, they know
they are in large ranks, but someone cares about them enough to
listen to them. And the judge can stand up for their rights,
especially if their lawyers don't.
And my third and last point is one that Jack has been an
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innovator on; he's been a good scold to us in the plaintiffs' bar
because in his writings and in court, he is always pointing out that
we do tend to lose track of our clients too. It is not the judge's role;
it is a plaintiffs role. A class action counsel doesn't have clients;
but even those of us who do have individual clients, still, if you
have one thousand Fen-Phen victims you've got to handle them by
the numbers, notwithstanding what we say in our ads about, you
know, each person counts individually. And Jack has been there in
his writings to say that, no, you have an individual obligation, you
have to communicate with your people, you have to give them a
voice, empower them in their own litigation. And the aim of the
plaintiffs' bar, let's say, to get large fees or whatever, must be
moderated, as Jack counsels, by your obligations to the system and
to your own clients.
So, Jack, I salute you as a good killer of the Giant in the
Beanstalk.
Moderator
Thank-you, very much. Professor Mullenix.
Professor Mullenix
Thank-you, very much and I also want to thank Brooklyn Law
School and the organizers for bringing me up from Texas to come
participate in this. I think it is very, very exciting and also happy
birthday, Judge.
We were sent two articles to read and I have dutifully done
that. I have read everything that Judge Weinstein has written
relating to mass torts either in articles or books or certainly the
lengthy, lengthy opinions. He has been kind of both a benefit and
bane of my life, having to distill those opinions down into
something you can fit into a casebook for students. It is an
impossible task, but it is lots of fun.
I also absolutely thoroughly enjoy reading everything that
Judge Weinstein writes. I approach everything with a set of
anticipation and anxiety, because I know that someplace in there, I
am going to have what I call "my Judge Weinstein moment."
Which is, I am going to get really irritated. And I was reading
through these two articles and it happened, and I will tell you
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where. So it is a lot of fun.
What I do want to talk about is Judge Weinstein's evolving
jurisprudence, because I think that for people who have followed
Judge Weinstein's career, you actually can see this. And I think by
the time I got into the mid-to-the-late 1990s, it was very clear
through his articles, that he had evolved jurisprudentially to the
concept that mass torts in the late twentieth century basically were
a version of public interest law litigation. And the model he was
using, basically, was what many of us grew up with and were
excited about, which was the 1960s-style public interest litigation;
that is, the cases dealing with institutional reform.
He basically said, we just have the same thing except it is a
tort, rather than dealing with institutional problems, to be dealt
with through class action litigation. My take on that was, at least in
part, the reason why Judge Weinstein wanted to envision mass tort
litigation as just a reincarnation of 1960s-style public interest law
was to justify the role of the activist judge. We certainly know it
existed there, so you just kind of translate that and impose it on
mass tort cases. And I have written extensively about this and I
obviously have problems with it.
Well, in reading the two most recent articles that were sent to
me, I now came to the conclusion that Judge Weinstein's
jurisprudence has evolved even further. What he has done in these
two articles is basically to step back and look at an even bigger
picture. He wants to look at the entire societal way in which the
system deals with mass delicts.
When he steps back and he is looking at the really, really big
picture, what he sees is a three-legged stool. That is his metaphor.
He says, "What we have here basically is a three-legged stool."
And the three legs are the criminal law system and the way that
deals with mass delicts, the administrative/regulatory system and
that's another way we deal with mass delicts, and then the civil tort
law system with a focus on, obviously, class actions. In describing
this three-legged stool, he basically comes to the conclusion that
what we have are three unequal and kind-of wobbly legs.
And for him the strongest leg on this stool is the civil tort leg,
through the class action. That's the point in his articles in which I
had my Judge Weinstein moment, when he gets to talking about
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the civil tort law system and vindication of rights through the class
actions. It is at this point he begins to wax very eloquent about how
this really is the strongest leg because it is a bottom-up approach,
the most democratic way of resolving mass torts. And he goes on
and on, and has written about this elsewhere.
Where he wants to go with this model of the three-legged stool
is to say that we need to have a carpenter come in and make it all
work together. What we want to have is a stool where all the legs
are working; we've got a strong structure. And I think the
interesting question is, that it all sounds, very, very interesting, it is
a very interesting concept. But is it feasible, can it be done, can we
get it to work?
In looking at this evolved jurisprudence, I have a sense of
where it is coming from and how Judge Weinstein has arrived at
this point. It is a combination of two different things.
One, I think that in recent years Judge Weinstein actually has
begun to study and look at how civil law systems on the continent
deal with and resolve aggregate claims, either mass tort claims or
environmental disasters and so on. And he has come to appreciate
that in civil law systems, on a comparative law basis, they deal
with these problems in very, very different ways.
I think one of the things he has come to appreciate, for
example, and he uses the example of France (it is also true for
Italy), that in these countries you can annex civil law claims to
criminal law proceedings. He kind of likes that. He thinks that is a
very intriguing idea, to serve purposes of efficiency and so on.
So, he likes that concept. The part that he rejects in civil law
countries is what he calls "governmental top-down solutions." And
he says, "I don't like those, basically because they are
undemocratic." I guess they offend American values that he
appreciates. I think in particular what he is talking about are the
countries that have solved mass torts through fund solutions. If you
read the comparative law literature, for example, you know that in
Germany they resolved the Thalidomide cases through a
governmental creation of a fund that was funded by the defendants
and the government.
Now I would like to put in my two cents about what to do with
this evolved jurisprudence. First, in reading the articles that were
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furnished to me, I continue to have a quarrel with the notion that
resolution of mass torts through class actions represents "bottom-
up" democracy. I absolutely reaffirm what Kenneth Feinberg is
saying. My answer is, yes, you have the democratic model, but it
may be sui generis to Judge Weinstein. When you talk to other
lawyers and anybody who is involved in lots of class actions, one
begins to worry about whether what actually goes on resolving
class actions represents "bottom-up" democracy.
With regard to looking to civil law systems for possible
alternative ways for resolving these cases, is to think outside the
box. This has relevance for a conversation about the victim's
compensation fund. This is obviously a very intriguing and
interesting idea for me because in the history of the United States,
we do not have models of legislative solutions of mass disasters.
This is common in the rest of the world. It is highly unusual here. I
think we should give this approach a chance, because I think we
are all going to kill it off in its inception. No sooner had it emerged
when, I have no doubt, large numbers of people's academic careers
are going to be made over writing about the victim's compensation
funds.
Many people in the room already know that the DOJ has just
put out a notice of informal rulemaking. They are seeking
comments from attorneys to help structure the legislation for the
fund. I think this offers an opportunity for an interesting
combination of both the "top-down" and a "bottom-up" approach
to deal with a mass disaster.
I hope in working through the guidelines, whatever is going to
happen in that model will include provisions that are going to
minimize transaction costs, particularly with regard to involvement
of attorneys. I hope attorneys are involved actively in drafting the
guidelines and the forms. Whatever the procedures, that attorneys
should help and assist in creating a fair and simple system, and in
that process not create an intricate set of rules that is going to
require intensive attorney participation to accomplish
compensation to victims.
In other words, I hope that attorneys aren't involved in creating
a lot of work for themselves. And in the end, and I hope I am on
the same page with Judge Weinstein with regard to this, I think
HONORING JUDGE WEINSTEIN
whatever happens is that compensation should go back to the
victims, and not be consumed into transaction costs and attorneys
fees.
Moderator
Thank-you, very much. We have two more people to give short
presentations and then we are going to open it up. The next is
Judge Scheindlin and then we will have Judge Weinstein.
Judge Scheindlin
I want to start by thanking Judge Weinstein. First of all, he
gave me the most reading. It far surpassed any briefs that I saw,
any circuit opinion that I saw. It was surely the highlight of the
reading week.
But, more importantly, ten years ago I was a magistrate judge
in the Eastern District of New York and had the opportunity to
work with Judge Weinstein on the Agent Orange case,7 which I
think was sort of the beginning, the mother, so to speak, of all of
the development that has occurred since then.
When I look back at that experience, there is one topic that I
want to speak about that no one has mentioned so far, and it is
very, very important. And that's the topic of special masters. I
want to speak about special masters because I speak as an ordinary
judge, not a giant. So to answer what Ken Feinberg was saying,
those of us who are not giants, but who are only ordinary laborers
in the field of judging need a lot of help. We can't do what the
giants can do.
And so we have to have somewhere to turn. I think that the
model of Agent Orange and the use of special masters is something
that has developed enormously in the past ten years, and I want to
discuss that. I was a special master in that case, in charge of
discovery and other pretrial matters (the more mundane part of
special mastering). But Ken Feinberg and others were appointed
special masters to really hammer out the details of settlement and
distribution plans, and their work there became a model for many
7 In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 597 F. Supp. 740
(E.D.N.Y. 1984).
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mass tort cases since then.
Special masters, I believe, are essential to implement the
complex compensation schemes that grow out of these mass tort
cases. Ordinary judges are bound by many restrictions and often
lack the necessary expertise which sadly prevents them from doing
the hands-on work of developing satisfactory compensation
schemes.
Examples are obvious: ex parte contact with parties or
attorneys; contact with experts outside of the presence of parties or
attorneys; detailed knowledge of investment vehicles or long-term
insurance payouts; an understanding of the contact one would like
to make with necessary government agencies, government officials
or foreign governments. It is these types of roles that special
masters have repeatedly played in mass tort actions, such as Agent
Orange, asbestos, breast implants, Holocaust cases and many less
well known cases.
I took the time yesterday to run a quick Westlaw search for
recent cases supporting special masters. I think you might find it
interesting if I summarize five or six ones that you don't hear about
every day, just to show you the innovative ways in which special
masters are being used today.
In March of 2000, a Southern District of New York judge
appointed a special master to enforce and monitor a consent decree
requiring the EPA to produce a complex technical regulation
dealing with industrial cooling water structures and to recommend
an implementation schedule for building those plants.
8
In May of '99, a district court judge in the District of Columbia
appointed a special master to supervise jurisdictional discovery of
foreign defendants in a complex antitrust case. 9
In February, 1999, a District of Columbia judge appointed a
special master to resolve preliminary injunction requests by named
plaintiffs in a class action brought under the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act, where children had been unsuccessfully
8 Cronin v. Browner, 90 F. Supp. 2d 264 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
9 In re Vitamins Antitrust Class Actions, 1999 WL 1211449 (D.D.C. May
27, 1999).
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waiting for special classroom placements for years.' 0 Nothing was
happening while the class action was pending. So a special master
was appointed to deal with the individual preliminary injunctions.
In February, 1995, a New Jersey magistrate judge appointed a
special master in a prisoner class action regarding assignments to
the special housing unit, meaning the punitive unit, which were
being made based on race. The special master heard appeals from
the prison's decision to place defendants in what we call the SHU,
Special Housing Unit. The parties agreed to be bound by the
findings of the special master without the possibility of appeal. The
special master's decision would be final as to where the prisoner
could be placed.
In May, 1995, a Pennsylvania judge appointed a special master
in a securities class action to supervise both settlement and
discovery.l Now, that was an interesting one. The special master
there recommended that the judge delay deciding class certification
and whether to add additional named plaintiffs because the special
master thought it would affect the settlement. In fact, the special
master achieved a settlement which the court then approved.1
2
The last example, in December of 1992, a Northern District of
New York judge, in a voting rights case appointed a special master
to prepare a redistricting plan for the entire state of New York to
protect the rights of voters if the state did not timely prepare such a
plan. 13
So I throw these examples out to you to illustrate the various
ways in which special masters can be used as a supplement to the
courts when merely ordinary judges find themselves in charge of
very large mass tort. But not just mass tort, which is an important
point I want to make. Special masters can be useful in any kind of
large consolidations. On that note-just a short plug, the Advisory
Committee on city rules of which Sheila Birnbaum and I are
members, has now proposed a revision of Rule 53, which is the
10 Blackmun v. District of Columbia, 185 F.R.D. 4 (1999).
1 In re Chambers Dev. Sec. Litig., 912 F. Supp. 822, 825 (W.D. Pa. 1995).
12 Id.
13 Fund for Accurate and Informed Representation, Inc. v. Weprin, 1992
WL 512410 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 1992).
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rule appointing special masters. The revision totally opens up that
rule. While we don't admit it, if you read the rule in its subtleties,
it now actually quietly encourages judges to appoint more special
masters with much broader functions. It moves away from the
prior rule which was completely outdated and talked only about
trial masters, which is the least used form of special mastering. So,
I think we owe that development to Judge Weinstein and we thank
you.
Moderator
Well, the last person to give a short presentation in this
morning's session will be Judge Weinstein and then I am going to
explain how we will organize the rest of the day.
Judge Weinstein
Thank-you. I approach this opportunity with the greatest
trepidation. One of the speakers this morning has, in effect, said in
her writings of me, enough already with the ethics and the
philosophy, just decide the cases and shut up. Old habits die hard.
So I have written an essay, but I won't read it to you.
It is striking to sit in this room, this beautiful high ceilinged
room with people, academics and others, who have given such
intellectual attention to this constantly changing problem. If you
look out the window beyond the room, you will see in the near
distance a state court, the most important of the state courts. That
state court deals with children and families and oppressed people
who we have not dealt with well, but who are now beginning to
come into the federal courts. My most difficult case at the moment
involves abused mothers and how the state affects their families.
That's in the near distance of this great institution.
When you look a little further, you will see the first major
federal courthouse being constructed in the twenty-first century.
Nobody knows what that federal court is going to say and what
problems it is going to face. We do realize that the group in this
room and in this institution will provide the theory that will control
what the judges of that court do.
Look a little further into the far distance. You will see nothing.
You will see nothing because that's where the Twin Towers were
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visible. They have been blasted out with the death of some three
thousand people, who we are now thinking about. We are
considering how we can deal with equivalent mass disasters-
many of which creep softly into our attention, as in asbestos, rather
than abruptly, as in an explosion.
Think about the problems of integrating the tort law and its
kind of chaotic way of dealing with these problems, and the
administrative method reflected in the Act that Congress adopted,
which is not yet viable and needs a lot of changes or imaginative
interpretation. Consider by comparison the European system-
which is perhaps epitomized by the $10 billion Deutsche
Institution now paying or trying to pay off the Nazi slave
laborers; 14 compare the lack of transparency of what is being done
in that institution and what will be done here. That German case is
temporarily in my court. The cases involving 9/11 compensation
will be heard in the Southern District-a sensible consolidation.
We ponder here the effect of the different institutions available,
of the enormous variety of kinds of events we deal with and of the
almost anarchic way we deal with them. Nevertheless, we tend to
treat these situations and the people who are hurt by them fairly
effectively. We are able to utilize a bottom-up viable solution, case
by case, and person by person. Our system hasn't worked too
badly. It has been flexible. It has been pragmatic. It has met some
of these new problems of our strange new social and technological
society that have to be met by our legal and political system.
We are utilizing a judicial institution that was developed for
three million people in a rural agricultural society. We are trying to
apply the rules of that archaic system to three hundred million in a
multi-billion people world. There is no way that you can have a
single institution in a democracy handling these problems
effectively for the predictable future.
Holmes came out of the Civil War. (This part of Brooklyn here
is very historical; the first major revolutionary battle was fought
here in 1776 with the British; and the Civil War riots took place
within sight of where we are.) Holmes came back from that Civil
14 See Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation (Swiss Banks), at
http://www.swissbankclaims.com (last visited December 26, 2003).
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War and his decisions thereafter were reflected in the fact that he
remembered that the Union almost broke apart, and that one of the
things the judicial system had to do was keep the Union together.
I, and many other people here, lived through a period when a
terrible Nazi-Japanese-Italian set of institutions almost destroyed
democracy and killed tens of millions of people. That's in my
background. I can't escape it. What it leads to always in every one
of these cases is the question: what can I do for the individual-the
person who is suffering, or may not be suffering, but thinks he or
she is suffering?
How can I handle that, how can I dignify that person? What
can the court system do to avoid the rigidity of matrixes that treat
people, not as if they were individuals, human beings, but as if
they were just marked as numbers (as were so many holocaust
victims)? That's the problem for me.
The enigma for all of us is how can we use our systems so we
do not lose that sense of the dignity of the individual without
losing efficiency. Our legal structures must be competent, with a
lot of play. No one institution, whether it is private, administrative,
political, or judicial can exercise all power. That's why, when I
spoke in Geneva, I emphasized the bottom-up.
One of the great resources of our nation is the legal profession.
It is entrepreneurial. It is selfish. It is sometimes stupid. It has all
kinds of conflicts of interest. And yet, it is independent, fighting
for individuals against institutions. Lawyers need to be kept
forceful and effective. That's why I always end up with the tort
system and entrepreneurs and why, sometimes, Professor Twerski,
I ignore the principles that we learned in the first year in law
school, but have not forgotten. We put them aside because we have
to concentrate in this mass world, this cruel world, on the
individual and what we can do for each person. We have the
opportunity to either harm or help. How can we retain individual
justice in a world of mass delicts?
Moderator
Thank-you, very much. I sense that there are two streams of
ideas. One really about the present and the past, the second about
the future. One is about how mass torts has developed as a practice
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today with questions about special masters, state and federal
coordination settlement practices, choice of law. And the second,
what is going to happen post September 11 th. Whether or not the
new model is something that we should think about self-
consciously, and if we do, whether it really captures coordination
between government and private actors.
My proposal is that we focus on the first category of ideas for
the moment and then after our break, we can focus on the second
category of ideas. And I know some people were provoked by
some of the discussions about the airline stabilization bill. But I
was wondering if we could hold those questions until after the
break, because I think there is a lot to talk about. So, I am going to
ask someone who hasn't spoken yet to ask a question and then I
am going to let you raise your hands and I will call on you in order.
There was a discussion about the notion of top down versus
bottom-up. And I raised the point that at the center of the theory of
Weinstein, until this moment, is the strong judge. Professor
Goldberg, do you see a contradiction here? Isn't there a
contradiction between a Weinsteinian theory that represents private
mass tort litigation as a bottom-up democratic practice, but at the
center, there is well, the strong judge who takes it upon himself to
shape and coordinate, using all the brilliant stratagems we have
heard about. Is that democracy or is that a Trojan horse?
Professor Goldberg
Well, as a former clerk to the judge I would say, of course, it is
not a contradiction. But thank-you for putting me on the spot. It is
a great question. Let me answer it somewhat indirectly and I will
try to keep it short. The judge's greatest quality in my mind is his
refusal to believe that anything is impossible. Anything can be
overcome, whether it is International Shoe or the problem of
administering a million claims or thousands of claims.
Let me give you an anecdote from when I clerked, which has
nothing to do with mass torts just to play this out, then I will
answer the question, I promise. We had this very un-mass patent
case involving two litigants, A versus B. And the supposed
infringement was of a plastic fence with tubing that ran through the
fence to keep the vertical slats intact. Only on Long Island, right?
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The original patent had the horizontal slats shaped with a hollow
rectangular shape, so if you looked at a cross-section it would look
rectangular. The new product that supposedly infringed had a
cylindrical shape to it. The question was whether that was an
infringement. After a lengthy discussion, Judge Weinstein turned
to me and said, "I think I just squared the circle." And that, I think,
is emblematic of his "can-doism."
So, all right, I wonder if Judge Weinstein hasn't tried to square
the circle here, to pick up on your question. I wonder if life is, and
our legal categories are, more intractable than he would like them
to be.
The notion of bottom-up and democratic participation, it seems
to me, is trying to do the following work: We are going to
synthesize the best of private law and public law. We are going to
take the classic notion of tort-that of a wronged individual in the
agrarian society of England suing his wrong-doer. But at the same
time we are going to bring the best of the regulatory state by
delivering mass justice. Hence, we get individual justice in mass
litigation.
The title says it all; it is the attempt to synthesize, to square the
circle. And I worry that the notions that the Judge has variously
expressed as "communitarian" or "bottom-up" principles do not
actually achieve a synthesis, but instead subsume the traditional
notion of tort law as private law into a public law, regulatory
vision.
Judge Weinstein says that there is bottom-up participation, that
mass tort litigation is democratic, that it is communitarian, that as
Paul Rheingold said, that there is someone listening. Judge
Weinstein believes that tort law can be both "mass" and
"individual" because each litigant will be able to come into court
and be heard. But be heard on what? The litigant will be assured in
the following way: "Yes, you have been injured.., we
acknowledge your misfortune." This is surely something. But what
is missing is the central idea of tort law. When tort law "listens," it
says: "Yes, you have been injured, and yes, there is someone else
responsible for what has happened to you, and therefore you are
entitled to go against that person."
When Judge Weinstein held fairness hearings in the Agent
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Orange litigation, they were not about Dow Chemical behaving in
an irresponsible way that-creating a defective product-so as to
cause injury. We don't think Dow and other companies actually
caused any injury. So, what were the hearings about? They were
about the government's execution of the Vietnam War. The idea of
people coming into court and telling their stories and being heard,
while a very powerful idea, doesn't work as a true reflection of the
private law idea that there are other people who ought to be held
responsible for the bad fates that have befallen them.
Moderator
I am taking names now, so if you want to speak raise your
finger. Aaron?
Professor Twerski
I was involved in the Agent Orange litigation, believe it or not,
on the plaintiffs side. And Judge Weinstein was responsible for
one very severe migraine headache that I had after appearing in his
courtroom, where he worked me over pretty well.
But I agree with what John has just said. Agent Orange is an
example of where the judge as philosopher-king fashioned
something out of nothing. Causation was nowhere near proved
then and still hasn't.
What was proven was that there were some bad actors. And
that Dow Chemical and Diamond Shamrock had some meetings
where they wanted to withhold some information about the
dangers of Agent Orange from the government. And I think that
this idea of going after bad actors who may not have had causal
responsibility for what took place, is a theme that is running right
through a good number of the class action cases. And yes, I am
troubled when an issue such as causation is given short shrift. It
makes me very, very uncomfortable.
One other aspect: national consensus in law. It is a really
interesting concept; it worked for us in Agent Orange. But, you
know, it just ain't so. Just look at the decision in Wisconsin a
couple of months ago in the latex glove cases, where Wisconsin
said that whether or not the manufacturer of latex gloves knew or
should have known about the dangers of latex, or whether the
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dangers were scientifically knowable at the time the gloves were
marketed, doesn't make a difference. 15 Wisconsin is out of sync
with the law in forty some other jurisdictions. That is a real
problem. There is just no way to paper over it.
California, in a decision that came down a week later addressed
the issue of scientific knowability of risk in a latex injury cases and
said you cannot impose strict liability or a consumer expectation
test with regard to latex injury cases. 16 Now, I know on which side
of that debate I come down on. But regardless of what I think is
right or wrong, the fact of the matter is that we have nothing like
national consensus. In reading case law when drafting the Products
Liability Restatement, I would have liked it to reflect national
consensus. But that's not the way the world is. We have state
courts out there doing very, very different things. Sub-classing is
not an easy solution to this problem. If varying state laws have to
be presented to a single jury, the great likelihood is that the trial
will be unmanageable.
So, if judges are to behave as philosopher-kings, unrestrained
by law to work out solutions as they see fit, that may work-but it
isn't law being applied to a controversy. Perhaps the fault is mine.
My Talmudic training has imbedded in me a very, very deep
respect for law and for precedent. Seat of the pants justice no
matter how noble and well-meaning frightens me to death.
Judge Weinstein
Let's take the Agent Orange and the asbestos cases, because in
some respects they represent the same kinds of problems. In Agent
Orange, there was no direct proof in a tort sense that somebody
was injured by a particular act under tort law.
There were poisons, however, that were put into the
atmosphere through carelessness by producers. How many people
were injured? Which particular people were injured? How much of
the atmosphere was denigrated? Nobody could tell with respect to
a particular person. But that there was an injury in a sense to the
community, not attributable or provable in traditional terms to an
15 Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., 629 N.W. 2d 727 (Wis. 2001).
16 Morson v. Superior Court, 90 Cal. App. 4th 775 (2001).
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individual plaintiff, seems to me to have been clear. Payment
should have been made under those circumstances, money utilized
in some community care (and I know you don't like that) way that
would permit those who might have been injured to benefit.
Asbestos is a disaster which crept up on us. We are now in
Manville paying only 5 percent of the amount of damages that we
know was suffered.1 7 Asbestos is scattered throughout our country.
It is a substance that causes, in the community enormous amounts
of damage. That should be paid for, not necessarily to each one of
the people that has a few spots on his or her lungs. How it should
be distributed in this kind of mass case is a problem different from
that in individual tort law. The same thing is largely true, I think,
of the slave labor cases and the methods of distribution of the
funds available there.
Punitive damages need to be distributed on a communal basis
in many of these cases because it is the community that suffered.
And it is a community that isn't being paid for the harm that is
being, or has been, done.
Now, the old tort law fails in these cases and the solution has to
lie in the use of some kind of administrative agency-sometimes a
quasi-administrative agency of the court, which is often
unsatisfactory. Use of such agencies is not what we are appointed
for; it is not what we are trained for. A true administrative agency
will find increasing utility as in the tire cases.' 8 In many other
cases the problem will be addressed by the criminal law or
privately in arbitration.
All of these institutions for dealing with this kind of problem, it
seems to me, have to cooperate because the tort law falls short in
dealing with this kind of case. And the courts are not themselves
capable, except on an ad hoc basis, of setting up an administrative,
democratically-selected agency. Now, that's beginning to change.
The United States Securities and Exchange Commission, the
17 Stephen Carroll, Deborah Hensler, Allan Abrahamse, Jennifer Gross,
Michelle White, Scott Ashwood & Elizabeth Sloss, Asbestos Litigation Costs
and Compensation: An Interim Report, RAND, Institute for Civil Justice,
available at http://www.rand.org/publications/DB/DB397/DB397.pdf.
18 See, e.g., In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. Tires Products Liab. Litig.,
155 F. Supp. 2d 1069 (2001).
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Federal Trade Commission, the various administrative agencies are
making their mark using huge fines after and before the harm
becomes apparent. We are seeing parallel changes in the criminal
law system through restitution.
We have to recognize that given the different kinds of cases,
different kinds of institutions have to handle them. And where the
other institutions are not yet available, then I think we have no
alternative, except, as in an Agent Orange case, to do something
that corrects, temporarily at least, the defect that we face as a
community and as individuals.
Moderator
The question that I wanted to keep us focused on at this half is,
until the new world is developed, how do we feel about the strong
judge doing it on the fly. That is what is happening, and it by
necessity involves many doctrinal and technical decisions and
choices that have been attacked and criticized in the law reviews
and in the mandamus petitions.
And the second question, which you are raising now, is
something which I think is very important, which I hope we can
get to. I see that Margaret Berger had her hand up.
Professor Berger
Yes, in part, what I was going to say the judge has said. I really
think that what-and Aaron's remarks pick up on this-is that
advocating that you apply to mass torts the principles that apply in
a totally different context does not work.
I think there is a disconnect between the individual horse and
buggy case and the mass tort. And insisting that the same theories
of causation apply and then lead to the same remedies that
traditionally apply in tort law, just is insurmountable. Because I
think we are talking about such totally different risk and such
totally different injuries and such a different involvement on the
part of society with regard to these mass incidents as compared to
the individual defendant, that I don't think the system works. And I
think that the class action, at least, gives one a vehicle for saying
we can somehow manage to distribute over a group of people,
which takes away some of the problems.
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And when you have a strong judge who perhaps can get state
courts to coordinate with him, you alleviate somewhat what Judge
Freedman was talking about. That you are going to run out of
money in one place before you get to the other. And certainly I
think the asbestos cases, with their enormous transaction costs,
really demonstrate that something is very awry in the way in which
all of this works. We need to think through what responsibility
should mean at this point in time. I know Tony doesn't want to
speak yet about the future.
But I think that we have seen that unless one somehow keeps
the lid on the tort system and its inflexibility with regard to these
issues, one really can't do any kind of justice. And rough justice, I




Well, as I listened to your manifesto to Aaron, I was reminded
of two words uttered by my late colleague Arthur Leff, which is,
"Sez You."
In many of these cases, it seems to me you are something of a
benevolent despot. Now if we are going to have a despot, I would
just as soon he or she be benevolent, and you certainly are. But it is
a despotism nonetheless. Now, that's a heavy statement and I have
been very depressed just listening to all the references this morning
to 9/11 and to the chaos in our society and slave labor and so forth.
While Tony was introducing the panel, I thought that I would
introduce a bit of levity by writing an ode to Judge Weinstein.
Tony thought that I was scribbling notes very carefully attending to
what he was saying, but actually I was engaged in the creative
process.
So let me read this. And then when I have done that and
perhaps won a little bit of goodwill from the judge, I have a couple
of comments on his Illinois paper.' 9 The last line of this poem has
some words in a foreign language, but as I look around this table, I
19 See Weinstein, supra note 5.
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don't think there will be any translation difficulty.
Oh, hail to judicious Judge Jack,
Whose judgments new laws never lack.
Towards claimant he'll mass, his actions have class,
For plaintiffs' insurance he'll stack.
Oh, hail to Weinstein, Jack B.,
Whose work product shames you and me.
Strong trial lawyers cower before his robed power,
Especially when he cuts their fee.
Oh, hail to his corpus so weighty,
After all, the judge just turned eighty.
Yet the freight train named Jack,
Still roars down the track,
While above beam his Bubba and Zady.
Does anybody in the audience need a translation?
Okay, I did have some comments on the lecture, which is, of
course, very provocative and makes some very good points and I
think calls attention to possibilities for a forum that we really ought
to take very seriously. I just want to make three very brief
structural observations in the spirit of skepticism or refinement, as
you like.
First, it is an amazing coincidence that each element of Judge
Weinstein's proposal has the likely effect of increasing the power
of the judge. I don't know how this happens, but it is amazing how
this pattern emerges. The theme of this is coordination and
cooperation. And who will the coordinator be? It is almost
certainly going to be the judge.
Now, cooperation and coordination are very important
elements of governance, but one person's coordination and
cooperation is another person's power grab. So the question is:
who is going to be the coordinator? Which incentives will animate
that coordinator? Somebody is going to be exercising power over
others, unless this cooperation is to be entirely voluntary. And
Judge Weinstein has provided us with some examples in which
apparently cooperative coordination of the three systems-he says
that actually there is a fourth system, ADR-seems to have made
some progress.
Another point is that in a decentralized system like ours, there
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is a lot to be said for mixed institutions, for redundancy, for
independent sources of initiative and decision. Even though mixed
institutions will almost inevitably create what seem like chaos,
inefficiency, and to some degree, lack of coordination.
In a system like ours, and given the political values that this
society cherishes, that is a good thing. This doesn't mean that it is
the optimal thing and it certainly doesn't mean that the mix, the
precise mix of power and influence and institutional weight that
characterizes the existing system of cooperation is the right one. I
think that Judge Weinstein has made an excellent case that it isn't.
But I don't doubt for a moment that we need a certain degree of
institutional competition, lack of coordination and independent
initiative even at the price of some chaos and inefficiency.
Moderator
Thank-you. Now, Deborah, you are the next speaker. I wanted
to ask you a question related to this, which is, given what Professor
Twerski said, do you think, based on your experience in studying
class action settlements, what we have is, in fact, the best
approximation of what people should have gotten had we had
infinite resources and they were able to prove causation and
liability? Or is it just that we are basically taking money from a
nice big pocket and giving it to victims of misfortune?
Ms. Hensler
Thanks for that question. I think based on the research that I
and others have done about settlements and class actions, one
would have to say that the outcomes are tremendously diverse.
Sometimes the outcomes provide considerable benefits for the
class, one could argue. Sometimes they also provide social benefits
to consumers and others beyond that.
Other times it is hard to see what benefits have been created for
the class or society that are commensurate with fees that have been
obtained by plaintiffs' attorneys. And consistent with the
discussion that has been going on, I think that the outcomes of
class actions depend very critically on the actions of the judge.
According to my research, a strong judge that takes his or her
responsibility under Rule 23 seriously and scrutinizes settlements,
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provides for true hearings on the fairness of the settlements, and
allows for objectors to come in a proper fashion is more likely to
obtain a good settlement for the class.
A judge who, instead, is focused on simply settling a case and
getting the case off the calendar, is likely to see a very different
outcome. And that brings me back to the more general issue that
Tony had raised for all. With regard to strong judges the question
is, of course, a strong judge for what? A strong judge can be
focused primarily on settling a case without regard to the merits of
the settlement. Judges do have substantial powers to press those
settlements and particularly in mass litigation with all the conflicts
that Judge Weinstein has written about and spoken about this
morning, there are great pressures to settle and to go along with
that judge. So, I think when we speak of the "strong judge" piece
of this paradigm of governance through private litigation, we have
to raise questions about this despotic judge, as Peter called him,
and what purpose the judge is serving.
I also want to raise one other point that hasn't been raised so
far. And that is democracy incorporates notions of representation
and notions of accountability. And as one of the first commentators
pointed out (it may have been Ken), the model we are really
talking about here is a model of strong judges and attorneys
working together with that strong judge. If those attorneys don't
truly represent the interests of their clients, if instead, they
represent primarily their own interests, and if neither the judge nor
the law require those attorneys to be accountable to those whom
they are supposed to be serving, then there is a very important
dimension missing from this notion of bottom-up democracy
through the tort system.
Moderator
Well, by happy accident, the next two people I have in my list
are, in fact, David Vladeck from Public Citizen and Professor Burt
Neuborne, who both I think have something to say about that.
Mr. Vladeck
Thank-you. I agree very much with Professor Hensler. The
question is not how to strengthen the role of the judge in
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overseeing class action cases; judges have ample power already.
Rather, the question is how to ensure that judges are invested in
just outcomes. We have seen far too many class action settlements
that do not achieve justice pushed through and approved by strong
judges. 20 To be sure, settlements are effectuated, dockets cleared,
class counsel collect their fees, class members get coupons or some
other trinket that passes as value, and defendants purchase the res
21judicata they seek. But I doubt that settlements of that kind
advance the ends of justice or instill faith in our judicial process. 22
It seems to me that when we discuss the future of mass torts,
the hard question is-compared to what? Is there any alternative
but to try to perfect this imperfect system? I submit that the answer
is no. No one can convincingly argue that we should go back to
trial by jury of each individual claim. That is not an option. We
would never finish trying asbestos cases, let alone the Fen-Phen
cases, or even the Sulzer hip replacement cases, which now
involve some six thousand class members. No one wants to try six
thousand individual cases involving the same product and the same
claims of injury.
But we cannot lose sight of the fact that today's system is
seriously flawed, especially when measured from the perspective
of the individual claimant. One minor but telling illustration is the
vocabulary we use to describe the mass tort litigation process. We
speak about "inventories," not about people. Judge Weinstein
20 To give an example, the settlement in Ortiz v. Fibreboard, 527 U.S. 815
(1999), was devised by and sheparded through the litigation process by a strong
judge. But as the Supreme Court ultimately concluded, the settlement impaired
the due process rights of class members and absent future claimants. Id.
21 See In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Products Liab.
Litig., 55 F.3d 768 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied sub nom. General Motors Corp.
v. French, 516 U.S. 824 (1995) (rejecting coupon settlement in case challenging
safety of certain GM pick-up trucks).
22 See Class Action Fairness Act of 2003, H.R. 1115, 108th Cong. (2003);
S. 274, 108th Cong. (2003). To the contrary, cynicism about class action
settlements has sparked a serious backlash against the use of class actions that
has taken many forms, including proposed legislation to permit the removal to
federal court of many class action cases brought in state court. Id. See
generally David Vladeck, Trust the Judicial System to Do Its Job, L.A. TIMES,
Apr. 30, 1995, at M5.
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started today's discussion by emphasizing the need to ensure that
every individual plaintiff feels that he or she is getting justice. Too
little attention is given to that imperative. Indeed, lawyers talk
about mass tort cases in ways that abnegate the interests of the
individual tort plaintiff whose claim has been aggregated,
commodified, and often homogenized (at the expense of the
plaintiff who has a superior claim) as part of an inventory or class
action settlement. The way we speak about these cases reflects the
way we as lawyers and judges feel about them.
So, in my view, the question that we must explore today is
what can we do to make the mass tort system we are stuck with
more fair and more just to all concerned. And to do so, we must be
careful to hold paramount the interests of each individual claimant,




Thank-you. I am just going to confine my remarks in the first
half, to retrospective issues. We will talk about the future later.
I want to say five things. That is the law professor in me. First,
having just lived through five years of intense work on class
actions with Mike Hausfeld (Mike was the invaluable person with
whom I worked on the Holocaust cases), I want to announce an
empirical fact. Every time I did any research, every time I
confronted a problem, every time we thought about how to
structure, what to do, what the problems were, the parameters of
both the law and the problems were set in Judge Weinstein's
remarkable corpus of work. So, when we talk about the future, we
talk about where we go from the plateau that Judge Weinstein has
built for us.
Second, I wanted to say something about heroic judging. You
know, Ronnie Dworkin's work on human rights assumes the
existence of Hercules as the judge.23 I know he was thinking of
Judge Weinstein when he wrote that. I mean, Judge Weinstein is
23 See RONALD DwORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986).
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the model of the Herculean judge; a judge who is able to move
mountains.
But that doesn't mean that only he can do it. I want you to
think about the model of the founding generation. The founding
generation was a generation of giants. If we had the choice today,
we would be governed by Jefferson, we would be governed by
Adams, and we would be governed by Washington. The
"devolution" from the founding generation to the existing
generation of political leaders is the strongest argument I know
against Darwin.
But that doesn't mean that only the founders could practice
democracy. We have learned an immense amount from the work of
a heroic, Herculean judge. What we must do, as Shira Scheindlin
points out, is learn from it, move forward, do the best we can, but
certainly not say that this is a jurisprudence that only Jack
Weinstein could carry out, because he was so uniquely positioned
to help us learn about it.
Third, what does it mean to be a "democratic institution"?
What does the judge mean, I think, when he says that we have
"democracy" here? We want to avoid a confusion between
democracy with majoritarianism or majority rule. The judge is not
talking about majority rule; he is talking about democracy, as a
metaphor for the fact that American institutions, when they work
best, work because they don't simply involve resolutions by the
political majority about what is efficient, expedient and a good
idea.
In the American model there are always going to be individual
voices saying, "But what about me? What about my individual
stake?" This solution may be fine for society in general, but "what
about me?" Or, this solution may be fine for large corporations, but
"what about me?" What makes the system so democratic is that
there is essentially a portal through the good offices of a lawyer,
for the individual voice of "what about me?" And I think that
makes the system work much better. In the second hour we will
talk about how that individual voice gets joined with other voices.
Fourth, there is Peter's suggestion that the judge is a
benevolent despot. Let's not lose track of the fact that the vast bulk
of what the judge has done over his career is to foster settlement.
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Judge Weinstein builds stages on which people can't escape from
his courtroom, so that they have to discuss resolutions. I mean, that
was DES, that was Agent Orange.
If they don't like what he does, if you can fight through the
interlocutory appeals rules, which, by the way have been changed I
think in large part because of him. You can get up to the circuit
and escape from this man who won't let you out of the room until
you sit down and talk to the other person about whether this can be
resolved in a just way. Now, that's a very narrow category of
despotism. He does not impose his own solution on you. What he
does is he imposes on you the obligation of sitting down around a
table and seeing if a solution can be resolved. If that is despotism I
think we need some more of it.
And then finally, let me respond to Aaron Twerski's
provocative and very thoughtful notion. Just before Jack was
appointed to the bench, Aristotle wrote, Nicomachean Ethics. I
have written about Jack in the Columbia Law Review that of
almost anybody I know he balances the three demands of
Nicomachean Ethics: the good, the just, and the formal.24 In
Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle wrote that all of us have the
challenge of balancing the good, the just, and the formal. The
"good" being the best for the society; the "just" being the right of
every individual to be treated in accordance with his just deserts;
and the "formal" being a scrupulous adherence to the rules. A great
judge keeps all three balls in the air. A great judge knows that there
is the requirement of the greater good for the society, the
individual right of each person, and an obligation to be
scrupulously loyal to the system of law.
There is a tendency among all of us to get sidetracked on one
of those ideas. Some of us become obsessed about the primacy of
doing justice to every individual regardless of the effect on the
society. Some of us say that whatever the society's needs are has to
take precedence, regardless of the effect on the individual; and
some of us say it is not my job to make those judgments, I will just
follow the rules laid down by someone else. You show me a rule, I
24 See Burt Neuborne, Innovation in the Interstices of the Final Judgment
Rule: A Demurrer to Professor Burbank, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 2091 (1997).
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will apply it, and I don't care whether it is good or just, as long as
it is formal.
Our greatest judges do a balancing act throughout their careers
of keeping all three balls in the air. That is inevitably unruly. It is
unruly because somebody who goes at it from only one of those
three ideas will always say the judge is ignoring that ball, and
advantages the other two. But a great judge respects all three ideas,
even at the expense of consistency.
The reason we feel as we do about Judge Weinstein, is that
more than any other American trial judge of his generation, and
with an intellectual capacity that forces us all to take cognizance of
it, he has kept those three balls in the air. And what he is doing on
his eightieth birthday, quite remarkably, is tossing those balls to us
and saying, "You keep them in the air too. Let's talk about how we
do it in the future." That's why I think this is such a wonderful,
wonderful opportunity to say thank-you.
Moderator
I feel like I am balancing the good, the break and the lunch.
Now I think that we should go to about 11:15, because I have a lot
of people who want to speak. And then we will break, and then we
will meet again for the second half. Next to speak is Mr.
Rheingold.
Mr. Rheingold
I am really glad to hear that the more recent speakers don't
think we have a broken system that needs radical repair,
notwithstanding what Shira has said about abusive and duplicative
class actions, she can't name one in mass tort.
Ms. Scheindlin
How can you say that with a straight face?
Mr. Rheingold
We don't even have class actions in mass torts according to the
Supreme Court.25 And the system works well. And they just fear
25 See Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
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that fifty state courts are all going to do the same discovery of the
defendant that the federal court and MDL is doing. It just doesn't
happen. It is a bugaboo that the opponents of the current system
would like to bring forward to us. But I think that with Judge
Weinstein's approach and what many judges have done in
following Jack's work, they've come to realize that through
coordination and cooperation these problems can be solved. So, I
am glad to see at least a whole lot of people are not for a radical




I think, picking up on what Burt has just said, in order to judge
the viability of what has occurred in the past as well as what is
ongoing in the present, we have to look somewhat towards the
future and David asks the question best, what is the future of mass
torts? And putting aside the legal aspects, I think the future that
there will be mass torts is great. And now what is our
responsiveness really to that challenge?
It was said before that Judge Weinstein is a strong judge
actually crafting his solution and his approaches on the fly. I
disagree with that, totally. I think the genius of Judge Weinstein is
that he has taken fundamental principles literally of natural law, I
think the terms were ethics and philosophy, and applied them
pragmatically to situations where there is a responsible actor and
injury to a mass number of individuals, but a difficulty is in
arriving at what the just solution is.
He also said something this morning that I think we all tend to
overlook. Not only are we trying to apply principles that were
developed hundreds, if not thousands of years ago, in an agrarian
society but to a society which has grown to the point where
individual actions don't affect only small numbers of individuals
but huge numbers of individuals. So as society has evolved, is
there not an equal responsibility on the part of the law to evolve to
correspond the responsiveness of the law to the difference in
society?
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And Professor Twerski, what I get from the issue of causation
is one which I think we are faced today with almost a paradox.
When we first put forth the proposition that the Swiss banks, for
example, were involved in a mass tort, it was laughed at because
no one could make the connection, at least at the time, between the
financing of a war of aggression and the victims of that war. And
now we see today what the government is the major proponent of
and the world is focused on, is tracing the financing for acts of
terrorism. Not because those who provide the financing are the
perpetrators of the terrorism, but they do provide the causal link.
So, how do you respond to the situation where you do have a
mass victim and a responsible entity, if you don't have a system
which is going to allow the victim to hold that responsible entity
accountable?
Again, in some of the Holocaust cases we saw what we thought
was a very perplexing attitude on the part of some of the
perpetrators. And that was, look, let's put this into the political
arena, let's have an international arbitration, let's discuss this in the
legislatures, but whatever you do, whatever you do, don't raise this
question in a court of law. Why not? Between the three branches of
choices that we have, the political, the administrative, and the
judicial, would we really want to trust our individual rights on
fundamental issues that affect not only our freedom, our liberty,
but our well-being to just the political and the administrative?
So, the issue as I see it from the perspective that we were
talking about is, is the judiciary an appropriate forum in which to
air these issues and which to attempt to resolve them? And I find
that the principles that Judge Weinstein has applied are the
principles that I feel most comfortable with. And as opposed to
seeing him as a lone dissenter at this point or the lone




I am going to pass my time to Barbara Wrubel, who hasn't had
a chance to speak and I know her views will be similar to my
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views.
Moderator
Well she's the next one on the list.
Ms. Wrubel
Words in praise of the tort system. I don't want to make
retrograde arguments, but I think strict rules of proof, of causation,
of admissibility of expert testimony lie at the heart of what we are
all easily calling mass torts.
Mass torts are massive wrongs. It is not just mass numbers of
people who claim they may be injured. In many of these mass
torts, we don't know if people are injured. If they can establish
their injury, they ought to be able to do that. They ought to be able
to come forward with competent medical testimony to establish a
causal nexus between their injury and some wrongdoing on the
part of the defendant. Not just that the defendant made a product, a
drug, for example, but that the defendant wrongfully failed to
disclose the risks associated with the drug. I don't understand why
we need to relinquish the zeal with which we demand proof of





I say both kinds of causation. If you have a system where you
say, well, we can sort of prove general causation, but the individual
can't prove it in the individual case, then I say, good, let's go to an
administrative system. If there is going to be a shortfall in proof,
why don't we have an administrative system that allocates the
money in a fair way amongst all of the people that claim to be
injured. That you ought not have the ability to concentrate massive
litigation in one place. You ought not have a shortfall in the proofs,
while giving a free ride for all on a claim for damages.
We all know, for example, that punitive damages are a wild
card. I enjoyed so much your article, because I kept dreaming of a
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day when we would take punitive liability and have it resolved
outside the tort system. These kinds of damages are designed to
vindicate society's interest in deterring bad conduct. The bounty
shouldn't go to plaintiff number one or plaintiff number two or
plaintiff number twenty. It should go in some way to society. We
should punish defendants that do bad things but put the issue into
an administrative or criminal proceeding and not keep it in the tort
system, which makes massive litigation concentrated in one place
too enticing to the plaintiffs' bar. There is too much money to be
made, and it's too coercive on the defendant.
After all, in all these mass torts, somebody is paying for this. In
Agent Orange, it may be that the chemical companies did bad
things. But it has been impossible to link those bad things to
Dioxin. If that's the case, why is there this need to compensate
people? They should have been compensated by the federal
government. These were soldiers, the federal government should
have done it. Private industry? I don't think so.
Look what happened in breast implants. That litigation
26bankrupted a wonderful chemical company. Hundreds of millions
of dollars were spent before a rule 706 panel concluded a failure of
a causal nexus.
27
Look at diet drug litigation. Does the science as we now know
it support a multibillion dollar liability? American Home Products
just reported a $13 billion reserve for the litigation. When you can
agglomerate all of these claims in one place without requiring
proof that this individual was caused an injury by a wrong of the
defendant, then I think it is a highly wasteful and inefficient
system.
Judge Weinstein, what I found so provocative about your
article is that there may be a way to share responsibility for
compensating people that are truly injured and there may be a way
26 See In re Dow Coming, 211 B.R. 545 (E.D. Mich. 1997); In re Silicone
Gel Breast Implants Products Liab. Litig. (MDL 926), 793 F. Supp. 1098
(J.P.M.L. 1992).
27 See National Science Panel, Silicone Breast Implants in Relation to
Connective Tissue Diseases and Immunologic Dysfunction (Nov. 17, 1998),
available at http://www.fjc.gov/BREIMLIT/SCIENCE/report.htm (last updated
Dec. 15, 1998).
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to do it partly through the tort system and partly through these
other systems.
Those are my comments.
Moderator
Thank-you. Now we have four people and we should break
soon. I have Professor Mullenix, Judge Scheindlin, Professor
Rosenberg, and Judge Freedman. I think we can get through at
least two of you. Professor Rosenberg, you will get the last word
and then we will start with Judge Scheindlin and Judge Freedman
in the next session.
Ms. Mullenix, you are next.
Professor Mullenix
I have just been sitting here and I absolutely cannot contain
myself at some of the outrageous statements I have heard.
I will say one or two things about what people have said, but I
do want to come back to the core question as you framed it, which
was, I thought, very interesting. What are we to think about the
phenomenon of the strong judge dealing with these problems on
the fly? There are one or two things that people haven't said that I
think are worth thinking about. Which is, why do we have this
phenomenon, and how does it come about? I think that there is at
least a kind of overarching systemic failure that nobody has talked
about.
Peter Schuck focused in and said we are talking about this role
of the activist or strong judge. A lot of this has to do with the need
for coordination. And this dovetails into what Sheila recognized
about this problem, of duplicative and overlapping class actions.
There are a lot of people in the room who, a week ago, were in
Chicago and attended the meeting of the Advisory Committee on
Civil Rules, where the proposed amendments to Rule 23 are
underway. There were a series of proposals to deal with this
problem of duplicative and overlapping class actions, and there
were proposed amendments or changes to the rules that are
designed to deal with precisely these problems. One was a model
rule that would adopt or codify preclusion doctrines. Then there
was a separate proposal that, by rule, would give injunctive power
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to the federal courts.
We were asked by the Advisory Committee about these
proposals. Five law professors including me-and I am a person
who thinks that the Advisory Committee has the most expansive
powers imaginable-came to the conclusion that those proposals
for dealing with duplicative litigation would violate the Rules
Enabling Act28 and could not be done by rulemaking. I told the
Advisory Committee that even I do not think you can do this by
rulemaking. But I think it needs to be done by statute.
So here is where I think the nub of the problem is. We are very,
very good at identifying the problems. We've written about these
problems to death. We have had conferences about these problems.
We know what the problems are. The question is, how do you
solve them? We have come to the conclusion that you can't solve
them by rulemaking. The way that you need to approach solving
these problems is by statutory solutions, which means that
Congress has to do something.
Where does that leave us? We all know very well that
Congress has not been solving these problems. The multi-party,
multi-forum jurisdiction act has been reintroduced every year since
1988.2 9 The various kinds of statutory proposals that have been
introduced to deal with these problems never go anywhere. So we
don't have a rule solution, we don't have a political solution. We
have activist judges because the other mechanisms by which we
might do something basically have not worked. We have to ask
ourselves, what are we thinking or what are we doing about that?
I just want to comment on Burt's democratic model of class
actions. I was absolutely amused when he said, in describing this
democratic model, it might work so well that the system of
entrepreneurial plaintiff lawyers encourages democratic voices to
come forward to speak. They are the ones who come forward to
ask the question, "what about me?" But we are hearing different
things when we hear the question, "what about me?" When Burt
hears "what about me?", it is the lawyers saying "what about me?"
28 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (2003).
29 See Pub. L. No. 107-273, §11020, 116 Stat. 1758, 1826-1829 (2002)
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1369, 1391, 1441, 1697 & 1785).
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for the claimants. When I hear "what about me?" it is the lawyer
saying, "what about me?" for the lawyers. That's my problem.
This model of participatory democracies from the bottom up is
basically a kind of the worst form of banana republics, with
autocrats running around cutting corrupt deals, absconding with
the loot for themselves, and then convincing the poor and
impoverished citizens that something has been done for their
benefit. And that I have obviously spent too much time in Texas,
Alabama, and Louisiana. I just have a different vision of what you
are all taking about.
Moderator
Okay, this is what I propose: the last person I want to call on is




Okay, Professor Rosenberg, you will get the last word and then
we will start with Judge Scheindlin and Judge Freedman in the
next session.
Professor Rosenberg
I don't think it helpful in seeking solutions to social problems
to start from a priori postulates of the "good," come-what-may.
We've been told that litigation is a form of "democracy" and that's
good; that some class action settlements "commodify" individual
loss as well as breach "principles of tort law" and both are bad to
do; that mandatory class actions deny the "right to a day in court"
and that's bad too; that congressional tort and related procedural
reform would destroy "states' rights" and "federalism" and that
could be bad or good depending on whether you like the status
quo. Even if I knew the meaning (and I haven't heard clear
definitions) of "democracy," "commodification," "day in court,"
"plaintiffs' rights," "loss," and "federalism," to list a few terms
being tossed around here, I would reject the notion that these or
any concepts should command obeisance from law makers,
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including courts. They don't even exist as actual things-they're
inventions of our minds that we constantly modify as required in
ordering (in multiple senses) the world.
What I think we should start with is what the law should be
aiming to do and that's a "should" and normative statement. And I
think we might even agree on it and that is, the law ought to aim to
improve the welfare of individuals. Now, how is the welfare of
individuals improved by the law in connection with mass torts?
Well, we have a good deal of evidence about what people want a
legal system to provide when it is dealing with accident risk. It
wants effective control of the risk. In tort law we call that
deterrence. I'll put aside the question of whether judicial sanctions
are of any practical use in deterring homicidal barbarians from
perpetrating the holocaust, the 9/11 attack on the United States, et
cetera.
When people are injured and have suffered major loss as a
result of an accident risk, what do they want? We have trillions of
dollars of evidence of what they want. It is called insurance. Now,
tort could supply insurance but it is notoriously poor at doing it.
And, in addition, most people already have it. So, what tort does
when it compensates is pay people extra money, in addition to the
insurance they already have. Now, if they wanted more insurance,
they could have bought more insurance from a commercial
supplier, or they could have gotten it from the government by
paying higher taxes they evidently didn't want to. Why would they
want tort to supplement the insurance they, themselves have
chosen not to augment? Of course, we never even asked them.
We mandate it. For example, products liability rules generally
preclude consumers from contracting out of "tort insurance" so
they won't have to pay its "premium" in higher product prices. The
same is true for the "tort insurance" mandated by the tort liability
regimes governing workplace, medical, and many environmental
risks. Tort insurance is notoriously much more costly and risky
than commercially and governmentally supplied accident insurance
that covers virtually everyone in the United States. Moreover, in
products liability and many other contexts, tort insurance charges a
distributionally regressive premium--"insureds" pay the same
amounts in higher prices and lower wages and employment
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benefits for coverage against the same types of accidents, but they
receive differential payouts depending on their relative income and
earning capacity (with social status and similar extra-loss factors
also influencing damage awards). Of course, some people can't
afford commercial insurance and must rely on what the
government provides. However, this only means that they certainly
can't afford the higher costs and risks of tort insurance. The fact
that we mandate it doesn't matter that it makes people better off.
And this whole conference, so far, has been turning on the
notion of compensation. How do we compensate? How do we
individualize this and that? People don't want that from the tort
system if it comes at extra expense and if it in fact isn't very good
insurance. We don't see them buying it. Tort insurance is a total
waste of scarce social revenues. If tort law usefully promotes the
social objective of cost-effectively reducing accident risk, then
damages should be assessed as a "fine" for deterrence purposes.
After paying the lawyers for their effort, the remainder of the fine
should be devoted to increasing the coverage provided by
commercial and government insurance-for the specific plaintiffs
or, better still, for everyone. People are better off with better
coverage for the general risk of death or disability they face from
all sources-non-tort (above 90 percent of total) and tort (below 10
percent of total)-than the alternative we presently impose:
providing better coverage for the tort risk of death or disability
than for the non-tort risk.
Judge Weinstein
If you look behind you, you will see where a million and a half
people live who are just about making it to their morning breakfast.
They are not buying insurance or anything else because they can't
even afford their next meal.
Professor Rosenberg
Judge Weinstein, you forced them to buy insurance when your
legal system said we are not going to pay attention to the contracts
that you might write with a product manufacturer that says, we
won't pay your compensation, we will reduce the price of the
product, you force them to buy insurance which you have just
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admitted they can't afford. Why did you do that?
Judge Weinstein
You are assuming a rationality and a middle class capacity that
simply doesn't exist for two miles out.
Professor Rosenberg
Judge, I am assuming at this point that you are running the
world. I do want you to run the world and I am asking you to run it
according to the best understanding of what makes people best off.
Let me switch for one second and say something positive.
What people probably do want from the tort system, although I am
quite skeptical of its capacity to supply it, is deterrence. Effective
deterrence. That tells us we don't want this causal
individualization. It also tells us it doesn't even make any sense
because in mass tort cases the mass production process that
produced the risk in the first place never had any sort of
individualized relationship with the prospective victims. Causal
individualization is an incoherent idea in these cases because they
all arise from mass production risks, which have no scientifically
determinable relationship to any specific individual in the exposed
population. There isn't any one-to-one relationship that can be
coherently adjudicated. It is a waste of time, because we can do
deterrence without it, and is almost intellectually barren as a
thought.
Moderator
Let's reconvene, I would say twenty minutes break, that's what
I say. Thank-you, very much.
(Recess taken).
I would like to say that I am speechless with appreciation and
with pleasure. This has been really a lot of fun for me. Truly it is,
as I said in the beginning, the law professor's fantasy.
As I promised, there are a number of people who wanted to
speak on the last topic before we move on to the second topic, and
I promised that they could speak. So, the list I have is Judge
Scheindlin and Judge Freedman and I believe Ms. Birnbaum.
And then we will stop. I am going to ask people to present
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these five minute thought pieces and then we will go back to the
discussion. Judge Scheindlin?
Judge Scheindlin
Well, I have been listening hard and we have used the word
democracy. I have been thinking about that. Clearly a judge acting
as a legislator is not a democratic concept and we really must
recognize that. The democracy that we live in has a tripartite
system, and we are supposed to have the legislature pass
legislation. And the problem is that they haven't. And as you said,
Professor Mullenix, if they haven't, we have a cap. But the
question is, is the judiciary qualified to fill that gap if they have not
been elected to make the laws?
So, I just think of models where there are laws and where we
can do some of the same techniques because the law allows us. For
example, in the securities area, we don't have the problems of
having choice-of-law and national consensus law and overlapping
state and federal jurisdiction. We just have the cases, and they are
an interesting model.
In my court is the recent IPO cases, where we have 950 class
actions filed in one court. We have all the potential chaos-yes,
but the chaos that could come from allowing 950 class actions to
reside with forty judges and inconsistent rulings and no
coordination of discovery would be unbearable. Instead we use
techniques to bring them before one judge and consolidate them.
But it is easy, we don't have the mass tort issues that we have
all alluded to here. And so my only point was if we were really
thinking democratically, we would have to be looking toward more
of a legislative approach, which I think is a segue to your second
topic. Congress has a responsibility and I know they have been
ducking it. I understand that.
But as we move forward to the second topic, we've got to go






Some of us were elected. Or at least one of us. But that doesn't
mean that being a judge is democratic. However, I would like to
say a few things, just responsive. There is no question that what
Judge Scheindlin said before about special masters has been
critical-in the way at least I functioned-in all of the mass torts
that I have in New York. And that is clearly based on the house
that Jack built.
Without Jack, I would not have been so inspired. I would not
have understood the role of special masters, nor would I have had
the moxie to appoint them in New York State Court, where there is
no provision for special masters.
I just did it by fiat. I did it in part because everyone knew
Judge Weinstein did it because the model was so good, and
somehow the lawyers have gone along with it and have agreed to
pay for the special masters. They are absolutely essential because it
is before the special master that the individual litigant really has
his or her day in court-the opportunity to tell his or her story. And
I think that that's essential because we talk about the opportunity
for individuals to tell stories and that being the fair and just way of
doing things.
That's a myth. There are no cases that get tried. What is it? 5
percent of the civil cases get tried-3 percent now. And that
doesn't mean that those people come into court. Most lawyers have
large inventories of cases. They may be pedestrian knockdowns or
intersection collisions, but they work with them. The lawyer who
appears in court is not the lawyer who has anything to do with, has
ever met the client, or who knows the client. The lawyer who
settles the case is not somebody who has any personal relationship
with the client at all. That's the reality of tort law in the United
States now. It has nothing to do with individuals getting their
particular days in court.
So that the massing and the allocation and the way it is done by
special masters-wonderful special masters like Ken Feinberg-is
essential to achieving that individual justice that we talk about. Just
a couple of other points.
Causation has been addressed now I think by the Daubert
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hearings.30 And although Daubert does not apply in the state
courts, most-I think-of the state judges are now following, for
example, the 706 findings of the federal court. And the 706 panel
was instigated by Judge Weinstein. We wouldn't have had it
without him, yet the whole breast implant litigation changed as a
result of that.
So, I think that fear that you all, that Professor Twerski and
Barbara Wrubel and Sheila raised concerning lack of causation is
no longer such a fear. I think with a 706 panel perhaps Agent
Orange might have gone differently, but that was then and this is
now. Daubert has brought a tremendous change.
At the same time, our Supreme Court, while wanting to take
away from the jury in Daubert has gone berserk-I think, if you
will forgive me-in Amchem and Ortiz by not allowing for
national class actions.31
So we are not only dealing with legislative lethargy, we are
dealing with a Supreme Court that maybe just not understand what
the real problems out there are. And I don't know if you professors
can make them understand it. I don't know if anybody can, with
the exception of Judge Breyer. I think the elephantine mass of
asbestos cases, that cries out for legislative solution, is just not
going to get legislature redress. The Supreme Court should
understand this.
Moderator
Well the last two people on this subject will be, I believe, Ms.
Bimbaum and then Professor Twerski. Hold on-Peter, do you




30 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993)
(implementing a new test for the admissibility of expert testimony that directs
the trial judges in the lower courts to use).
31 Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997); Oritz v.




Okay, then we have three. Ms. Birnbaum, Professor Twerski,
and then Professor Schuck.
Ms. Birnbaum
I would like to talk about several myths. My problem with
mass torts today is that there are large numbers of people who are
bringing suit, either in a class action or otherwise, who have no
injuries.
We are paying millions and sometimes billions of dollars that
could be used more productively, for example, for research and
development of new drugs and new products, rather than for
paying people who are not injured. And let us assume that in the
diet drug litigation, that there were several people, hundreds of
people who may have been injured by the drug in some way. I
think everyone will have to admit the vast majority of people who
were involved in the class action settlement had no injury. They
just took the drug. Some of my friends who took Fen-Phen are
members of the class and are receiving money, small amounts of
money, but money that adds up to millions and millions and
hundreds of millions dollars. They have sustained no injury and
should receive no compensation.
We have an asbestos litigation crisis in our courts because we
permit hundreds of thousands of people to come into the courts and
sue without an injury, or any functional impairment.
Asbestos litigation is now in its fourth generation with
hundreds and thousands of new companies being sued in the
litigation who were never sued before. We have forty-five
companies in bankruptcy because of payments to thousands of
people who have no injury or impairment. They are uninjured in
the traditional tort sense.
Why do these cases get settled? Well, when eight thousand
cases are instituted at the same time in places like West Virginia,
Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, where some of us spend great a deal
of our time, if you don't settle these cases the jury verdicts are
usually substantial. The company can be adversely affected in a
substantial way.
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The economic coercion on American corporations is
significant. We have wasted hundreds of millions and billions of
dollars in a system that has become irresponsible because of the
aggregation of huge numbers of cases that are impossible to try.
I am all for paying injured victims. For example, if there are
people with mesothelioma, who have suffered a substantial injury,
they should be recompensed.
The problem is not so much transaction costs, which are
substantial. There have not been huge transaction costs in asbestos
for five years, because there have been mass settlements. But the
presence of hundreds of thousands of cases that are in our courts
that should not be in the system, is causing a crisis. This mass of
litigations is creating all kinds of problems for the judicial system
and forcing corporations into bankruptcy.
Moderator
Well, this segues us into a causation question. Aaron?
Professor Twerski
I wanted to respond, basically, because I have been under
attack. Number one, in Agent Orange, I don't think we got close to
generic causation.32 And that may be true about breast implants as
well.33
David made the point that causation is not a problem because
these cases are never tried. Well, that's the point. They are never
tried because no defendant can afford to try causation in a class
action setting.
Judge Posner said it well in Rhone-Polunc: if you are trying
individual cases and you win ten out of twelve or thirteen out of
fourteen and you are forced to roll the dice on the entire comPany
based on one case in a class action, the risk is simply too high. 4
Now, I would really like to align myself with Margaret. I am
32 See In re "Agent Orange" Product Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740
(E.D.N.Y. 1984).
33 See In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Products Liab. Litig. (MDL 926),
793 F. Supp. 1098 (J.P.M.L. 1992).
34 In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298 (7&h Cir. 1995).
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not arguing for the 1840 model role of causation. But I think that
there is a causation question that has to be thought through, and I
don't think we have thought it through yet. And it has to be tied to
issues of fault. It has to be tied to issues of knowledge. If we are
going to try mass torts, we are going to have to rethink what kind
of causation model we want to have.
So, I do not want to align myself with the Neanderthals on this
issue. But it is absolutely imperative that we seek out a new model
for causation.
Some courts have fussed a little bit with the issue of
proportional causation, but that doesn't fully answer the problem.
35
What ought the causation rules be for defendants who seek to
remain ignorant about the causal connection between their
products and future injuries? That may have been taking place in
the breast implant cases. What does compensation look like in a
world where causation cannot now and may not ever be
determined? That is an important question that has to be faced.
And it doesn't get faced right now. We profess allegiance to the
traditional causation rules and they are not working. As a result we
confront huge settlements which may or may not have any
integrity.
So, I think we are going to really have to rethink the whole
world of causation in terms of corporate conduct and what kind of
compensation system we want in a world where we do not know
and may never know the answer to the causation question.
Moderator
The last person on this subject is Professor Schuck and then we
will move on to the next question.
Professor Schuck
I want to mention two logical errors that I see in this
conversation and outside it. The first was exemplified for me by
Judge Scheindlin's comment but other people have made it as well,
and Judge Weinstein certainly affirms this constantly. We observe
35 See, e.g., Herskovits v. Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound, 664
P.2d 474 (Wash. 1983).
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that Congress has not devised a legislative solution to a problem,
and the inference is then drawn that Congress is irresponsible.
Congress is immoral. Congress has been captured. Any sensible
and democratically legitimate institution would craft the legislative
solution.
I think that inference is illogical. It is illogical because there are
lots of reasons why legislative solutions are not developed, some
of which have to do with the fact that it is an incredibly complex
problem. And because it is an incredibly complex problem, the
solutions that lend themselves to legislative prescription may be
worse than the status quo. It may also be the case that there is no
political consensus on a solution. That is not capture. That is not
irresponsibility. That's the way democratic societies work. We
require a consensus on a solution-on how a problem ought to be
defined and remedied in a particular way-before we legislate.
It may be that the background institutions are thought to be
adequate to handle this, as messy as it may be. Which brings me in
part to David Rosenberg's comment, which is that one of our
background institutions is the insurance contract. Perhaps
legislators think that this is a better way to address this problem
because as he suggested-and I think his logic is irrefutable about
this-poor people and victims are going to pay for the insurance
one way or the other. They can get insurance through a voluntary
contract arrangement, or they can get insurance through the
mandated tort system. The insurance through the tort system,
however, is not an insurance contract that any rational person ex
ante would want to buy. After the accident, of course, it is a very
different story.
So, there are lots of reasons why legislative solutions are not
adopted, and I think it is wrong and in some ways rhetorically
irresponsible to suggest that the fact that no legislation was enacted
means that there is a void out there that the courts have to fill.
The second logical error relates to Aaron's point. In the Agent
Orange case, you established as clearly as your judicial rhetoric
could that generic causation had not been demonstrated, and you
subsequently told me that the scientific evidence that has emerged
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since then has fortified your judgment or causation. I think you
are absolutely right.
Why, then, did you feel that it was appropriate for you to
castigate and excoriate the government for not compensating
people whom you said have not been injured in the fashion that
was alleged? The government has veterans programs, medical
benefits, and so forth that were supposed to cover these injuries,
but you are suggesting that the government had an obligation to go
beyond that, even as you insisted that no causation has been
established. I don't understand that; it seems illogical to me.
Judge Weinstein
Well, you've got to talk about a political issue as you do,
compared to a private issue vis-A-vis the corporations.
As far as the corporations were concerned, it isn't true that
there was no causality shown. There were the rudiments of a





Certainly not enough to show that any particular person had
been injured by this stuff.
Professor Twerski
Even epidemiologically, that was your point, that
epidemiologically-
Judge Weinstein
Epidemiologically the case was not clear. Epidemiology is a
science, as you know, that has much more pressure put on it than it
can actually absorb.
The epidemiological studies then available and still available in
most cases, do not show individual causation-except in the most
36 In re Agent Orange, 597 F. Supp. 2d 740, 775-99 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
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rudimentary kind of situations, as in certain types of cancers,
mesothelioma from asbestos, certain types of lung cancer from
smoking, and certain vaginal cancer from DES. In the main there is
no epidemiology available that could show with sufficient clarity
individual causation from Agent Orange.
But there was at least at that point a hint of possible general
causality. We knew that poison was being put in the atmosphere
that could have been avoided. And with the skin tests of mice and
some of the other tests, there was the possibility of some form of
general harm caused by dioxin from Agent Orange.
As far as the industry was concerned, so long as you didn't
have to make a finding of direct causality to the person claiming
injury, you could within limits say that it's probable you did this
and this much general damage. Pay the damage and we will
distribute it in a reasonable way. Whether that was right or wrong I
am not sure.
But the political problem is different. The political problem, as
it was right after World War I, was to assess certain causality on a
basis requiring far less scientifically proved statistical
relationships. Right from World War I, some diseases were
considered as presumptively caused by combat. And in World War
II, and now in the Gulf War, we are making the same kinds of
decisions.
These are political decisions that I think are properly made in
favor of certain categories of soldiers, air personnel, and sailors.
You know, the people who are benefiting from the statutory
changes include the deep sea sailors who never had any Agent
Orange exposure, but there was some kind of a relationship
between the diseases and their service.
Professor Twerski
But they had veterans' benefits.
Judge Weinstein
No, they didn't. They had general veterans' benefits. They
didn't have veterans' benefits for those illnesses because they




The benefit system is different. There were no benefits at all
for the families. Now, they are beginning, for the first time, to
provide some benefits for the families.
The political decisions which gave greater benefits than pure
statistical analysis would justify, seem to me appropriate. That's a
decision that is democratic. It says this group of people suffered
more because-maybe because they were injured-but at least
because they were heroes and they think they were hurt and they
might be right; and we are going to give them more. I don't see
anything wrong with that.
Moderator
That's a really interesting place for us to transition, because in
your pieces that you sent out to us, you explicitly call for
partnering between the government and private attorneys as
opposed to what happened in Agent Orange, where the government
in some sense was an absent and unwilling participant, and we
essentially had to use a lawsuit against the manufacturers to force
them to accept responsibility.
In this second half I have a few people who have offered to
give short reaction pieces on that theme, and then we are going to
open it up again to the conversation we have been having.
The people who I have here are Mr. Hausfeld, Professor
Hensler, Professor Neuborne, and Mr. Vladeck. So, Mr. Hausfeld.
Mr. Hausfeld
Cooperation implies an element of voluntariness, and
sometimes it is difficult to achieve that voluntariness particularly
with government attorneys, both by reason, let's say, of the nature
of the assignment they have and of the type of case that they may
be prosecuting.
Let's do the criminal case first. Many instances of mass torts
arise out of situations where the government may act with a
criminal indictment, and then there is a private civil case or mass
tort cases filed after.
The difficulty that you have during the government
investigation is that the government attorneys are normally
consumed by, let's say, a grand jury process or an information
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gathering process for which they are precluded by law from
sharing that information with you.
Then, even after, there may be an indictment or a criminal case
brought. There is a difficulty in them matching their obligations to
pursue the criminal case with, let's say, a natural coalition with
private litigants to exchange information.
There are witnesses who may want to go into a government
immunity program or some amnesty program that they would not
otherwise do if they felt that they were then being thrown to the
private bar as an additional stop between the cooperation between
the government and the private attorneys.
The concept of cooperation also now involves exchanges on an
international level. In the antitrust area, which most people don't
consider is mass torts but, you know, an antitrust violation is a tort.
And there are such things now called global cartels.
What happens when there is a global cartel that operates, for
example, out of Europe which has international repercussions that
are only pursued in the United States? Can you get cooperation of
international agencies to exchange or release information that they
may have been gathering in the course of their investigations? Can
you basically bypass Hague rules and get information without
having to respond to the intricacies of Swiss privacy law or
German privacy law without, in essence, putting the person who
may have cooperated with an international government agency at
risk of prosecution within his own state for releasing information
which is then used in civil litigation in the United States?
You've got the Justice Department Antitrust Division in the
United States and you have the European Commission, basically
situated in Brussels, looking at the same types of global cartels.
Can you get cooperation between the European Commission and
the private plaintiffs that have not yet prosecuted their case in
getting the European Commission to share with you the evidence
that they might have? That transcends as well, not just the mass
tort antitrust aspects but mass tort aspects generally. Bayco 3 7 is
37 In re Baycol Products Liab. Litig., 180 F. Supp. 2d 1378 (J.P.M.L. 2001)
(ordering thirty-six actions "concerning the safety of Baycol, a prescription drug
used in the treatment of high cholesterol," to be centralized in the District of
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another recent example of how there might be cooperation between
government investigators in Europe and United States civil cases.
I think the frustration in getting that cooperation and the
benefits that you could receive in that cooperation are somewhat
highlighted by a present case that we have, where there is both a
government component and a private civil component. The
government has filed its lawsuit against the tobacco companies,
essentially piggybacking some of the concepts that were brought
by the states but also invoking a RICO claim.38
The public health aspects were dismissed but the RICO claim
was maintained.39 And the theory in the RICO claim was that there
should be a disgorgement because there was a fraud perpetrated on
smokers-that the smokers paid for cigarettes that they otherwise
obviously maybe would not have otherwise purchased. And the
cigarette companies or the tobacco companies should disgorge
their ill-gotten gains.
We filed a case on behalf of the smokers, and the government
said to us, "What are you doing in this case?" and we said, "Well,
we represent the smokers." And basically, they said, "Well, no
matter what happens, if we recover, you are going to want a piece
of what we recover." And we came to them and said, "Well, you
are basically acting as parens patriae for all the smokers, but you
haven't brought the cases parens patriae and you can't. So, what
gives you the right to recover the ill-gotten gains that were paid for
by smokers, when there are smokers who can recover in their own
right?"
Putting that aside, we said to them, "Look, the cases are in the
same court and they involve many of the same issues. Don't you
think we should coordinate so that we could minimize duplication
and maximize efficiency and strengthen the unity in presenting a
single case." They absolutely refused.
So, the government is now proceeding at its own pace, in its
own litigation style and mode, while we are proceeding on our
Minnesota).
38 United States v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 2d 131 (D.D.C. 2000).
39 See id at 135 (denying a motion to dismiss the government's RICO
claim but dismissing the government's public health claims).
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pace which now as we presented before the judge is actually
quicker than the government's pace, so that we can be ready for
trial before the government can.
And then what happens? Many of the motions that we now
have pending will decide issues that the government has to face.
Would it not have been better to coordinate the resolution of
those issues, as opposed to either one trying it without the benefit
of the other?
These are the practical problems, I think, that are facing
coordination and one in which there should be more of. But I do




I wanted to talk just for a few minutes about the implications of
the compensation program for the victims of the September 11 th
attacks.
As you know, Congress passed legislation authorizing such a
program very shortly after the attacks, and the Department of
Justice is currently drafting rules. There has already been some
public debate about what the rules might look like. There has been
controversy in particular about whether charitable contributions
ought to be offset against federally provided compensation.
And this week there has been some discussion about how
benefit determinations are to be made-whether they are going to
be made according to some kind of matrix or schedule of damages
or on an individualized case by case basis.
To me, the program is important for many different reasons.
Many people see it as a potential model for mass compensation in
other circumstances. But it is also an interesting program because,
at least as drafted by Congress, it appears very much as if the
model for this federal compensation program was the tort system.
And it seems to me, that both the passage of the program and
the debate that is arising with regard to it do raise questions, not
just about what is appropriate for the September 1 th victims, but
also what is appropriate in other mass tort situations.
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And I just want to very briefly run through the questions, many
of which echo some of the other concerns that people have
expressed about other mass torts.
The first one is how do we decide who is responsible for
dealing with the consequences of situations in which bad,
disastrous things happen to people through no fault of their own?
As we know in the U.S., if an individual becomes ill or dies of
natural causes, it can have huge disastrous consequences for their
family.
We seem, as a society, to be generally comfortable leaving that
to that family to deal with. But if we can link the illness to a
product or a substance on deterrence grounds and maybe on
corrective justice grounds as well, we think the corporation that
manufactured the product should pay. And clearly in the case of
September 1 th, Congress decided that we should all pay to help
the victims of the terrorist attacks, and I don't think there has been
any public dissent on that action to date.
So this seems that this division among different sorts of
disasters-not caused by anybody whom we can determine, caused
by some corporate wrongdoer, and caused by some terrorists who
are criminal-seems very tidy, until you look at it very closely.
And I think what we have been doing this morning is taking a
look at that. And we see in practice in mass tort litigation, litigation
in which there is considerable question as to whether the tort
claimants who recover are actually ill, whether their illness can be
linked reliably to a certain product, whether it can be linked in the
case of new asbestos cases to the negligence of the new
defendants.
And there are also mass torts, as we know, where there are
causation questions for some plaintiffs and not for others. And yet,
we pay those claimants about whom we have great question about
the legal claim, and thereby, inevitably leave less money to pay the
claims that are stronger on the law and the facts.
And we also clearly have mass torts where the government
took actions on our behalf that contributed significantly to the
harm. That was certainly true for those who were initially injured
by asbestos.
We could also think of situations in which, in fact, it is the
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government's fault that a device wasn't properly regulated, but
there has been no government contribution to compensate those
who were harmed.
In cases where there is a large mismatch between causation and
harm and the wrongdoer's behavior, notwithstanding David
Rosenberg, I think most deterrent theorists say it is very hard to
make an argument that the tort system is, in fact, an effective
deterrent system. But perhaps, there are other reasons why we want
to hold these corporations responsible.
It seems to me that the Congressional action-which is really
not unique-since we do have other federal compensation
programs, but nothing quite like this, should encourage us to think
about under what circumstances are different parties-the
government, corporations, individuals-responsible for harm.
Secondly, when we provide compensation for injury and death
through the tort system, the goal is to make the victim whole,
presumably, because that serves deterrent objectives and corrective
justice. But the consequence is to sustain the sharp differences in
income that exist in our society.
In the current debate about the rules for the victims
compensation scheme there is the notion that we should insist on a
plan that replicates tort and all the inequities in terms of real social
justice that flow from the operations of the tort system. That is
seen somehow, as an appropriate expression of a program that
represents the society's and citizens' desire to take care of victims
of these events. It seems to me to be questionable.
I think we need to think much harder in mass torts generally
about what our objectives ought to be with regard to compensation.
We ought to think about issues of whether there are situations in
which the appropriate objective would be to provide insurance or
even the possibility-I know it is not popular in this country-that
we might give more to those who need it, rather than more to those
who had the most to begin with.
Third, there is the issue that, when Congress chose to pass this
legislation, it clearly made some decisions about whom to provide
for. The act is rather narrowly drawn. We know in this city, as
elsewhere in the country and really the world, there are many




In mass disasters, where many people have small injuries and
few losses but others have significant injuries, our norm is to
allocate funds to all those who come forward without regard to
severity of injury, even though, as I said, that dilutes the resources
available for others.
Is that even the policy that victims themselves would choose, if
they were asked freely to express their opinions? Again, I think we
ought to think harder about that when we compensate people,
regardless of who pays for the compensation. Who ought to be
eligible for that compensation?
And, finally, there is the critical question that Jack Weinstein
has talked about-what the procedures ought to be for determining
who is eligible or compensation and how much they should obtain.
This week we have seen discussion about that issue in the press.
Some lawyers have equated administrative allocation schemes with
schemes that provide small, inadequate and unfair compensation,
and by inference, they have equated adjudicated determinations
with larger and fairer compensation.
The empirical evidence doesn't seem to me to support this
contrast in mass tort litigation. And I think that brings home to me
the need for us to work harder to design administrative systems
that can meld bureaucratic efficiency and fair process.
Moderator
Thank-you. We have already a growing list of people that want
to speak afterwards. So, I am going to ask the next few speakers to
be brief, and we will then move on to the open discussion.
Professor Neuborne
Sure. I want to respond very briefly to the Illinois piece that
Judge Weinstein wrote, which I found extremely interesting, and
very, very provocative.40
At the risk of attributing more grandiosity to it then it bears, it
strikes me that at this point in his jurisprudence, Judge Weinstein is
starting to think about a unified theory of mass tort compensation.
40 Weinstein, supra note 5.
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In other words, how you bring together in some single theory the
various institutional strains of efforts to deal with aspects of a mass
tort or a past event that has caused very dramatic injury to large
numbers of people?
In thinking about where we go in the future, I found the Illinois
piece got me focusing on why the system is essentially
disorganized, with groups operating separately, and why that is not
an optimum model. And that may tell us a little bit about what the
future ought to look like.
I come at it this way: As I was reading the Illinois piece, I
began to think to myself, what is it that we try to do when we try to
do justice in these mass settings-ranging from the extraordinary
experiment of the Holocaust cases, which may not be really court
cases at all but simply an opportunity to provide a judicial matrix
within which there is a political settlement,41 ranging to more
traditional litigations.
We are trying to do three things, I think. We are trying to
engage in disgorgement, where we feel that there has been morally
inappropriate behavior by someone that has resulted in someone
obtaining money that they shouldn't have. We have this sense-
there is a sense of justice-which requires that they disgorge their
ill-gotten gains. We also want restitution in some sense. Let those
ill-gotten gains be shifted to the people who actually deserve them
and from whom the money was taken.
And then, third, a more generalized idea of compensation, that
is unrelated really to disgorgement or to restitution, but some sense
that the victim population be left whole.
Deborah, one of the reasons why the September 11 th Act may
be interesting but not terribly helpful in mass tort, is that
disgorgement and restitution are simply not present. That is a
model of attempting to find compensation for a horrible event, but
not attempting to lay elements of moral determination that underlie
both disgorgement and restitution.
But it is clear, I think, in the cases that we do think about now,
we try to do all three. And I found myself during the Holocaust
41 Burt Neubome, Preliminary Reflections on Aspects of Holocaust-Era
Litigation in American Courts, 80 WASH. U.L.Q. 795 (2002).
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cases constantly thinking to myself-is this a disgorgement
strategy I am following, is this a restitution strategy I am
following, is this a compensation strategy I am following, and what
institution is best suited and what galaxy of forces are best created
to achieve the particular end of the litigation?
We don't often segregate out in our own minds whether it is
disgorgement, restitution, or compensation that we are trying to
achieve, and that's one reason why the current system acts in an
untidy way.
I am also going to suggest that the current system acts in an
untidy way in two systemic ways. Two systemic breakdowns-
that's what is really driving the Illinois piece-the systemic
breakdowns of the existing system.
The system breaks down, as Aaron Twerski brilliantly put it in
the first hour-the system breaks down on error deflection. We
may not want the same error deflection rules when we are thinking
about a disgorgement remedy, a restitution remedy, or a
compensation remedy.
When we don't know; or we can't know, and we have to
decide, how do we tilt it? What are the burden of proof rules?
I think, de facto, if I did a piece on Judge Weinstein's
jurisprudence, I could argue that, de facto, over the years, what he
has done is dissolve some aspects of the error deflection
mechanism into a much more sophisticated system, where if there
is a sort of general determination-call it generic causation, I don't
care, but call it some general determination of fault that would
justify a disgorgement remedy or justify a restitution remedy or
justify some sanction based on moral fault-at that point, he shifts
the error deflection rules and says essentially, "Prove that it didn't
cause it." And morally, that may be exactly right. It may be exactly
what we should do, but it is being done in a way that I think
sometimes has not surfaced, and we don't debate it enough.
And so, I suspect that the future systems and the systems he is
predicting will think much more closely about how you want to set
up error deflection along those three different streams-
disgorgement, restitution, and compensation. And it may well be
that certain institutions operating in this area will shift the error
deflection mechanism.
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If you have a government program, then you prove why the
person shouldn't get it, rather than why the person should get it.
And we can set those things up in a very, very subtle way to
achieve exactly the end we want.
The second systemic breakdown, this is written about in the
academic literature, but lawyers don't talk about it very much, is
an unholy alliance between defendants' counsel and plaintiffs'
counsel, which may prevent the system from working as well as it
does.
I know, as a human being, working in the Holocaust cases, I
couldn't put out of my mind what the consequences to me were of
certain actions. I tried very hard to do it, but human beings can't do
it. There is no way 100 percent you can put that out of your mind.
And there is a common ground between defendant's lawyers that
want broad releases, and plaintiffs' lawyers who can deliver those
broad releases and who owe a duty to the plaintiff class but also
are human beings and understand the economic consequences of
delivering the broad release.
That leaves us with a lingering sense that the institution isn't
functioning as well as it could. And as we go into the future, is it
possible to work out constellations of institutions, working on the
same problem that will both minimize the error deflection issue
and minimize the potential for conflict of interest.
As has happened so much in the past, the Illinois piece points
the way to do that-by collaborative action, by various institutions
that can check each other in areas where the existing system breaks
down.
I will just close by saying, if the Holocaust litigation has any
interest for the bar generally-and it may not, because it really
may be sui generis-but it if it does have interest for the bar, I
think it is going to be the fact that Michael and I are running a
controlled experiment here. We are running a controlled
experiment with two systems: a Swiss settlement, a settlement that
is operating under very traditional Rule 23 standards, brilliantly
supervised by Chief Judge Korman. And while the negotiations
were a coordinated government-plaintiff bar operation, the actual
administration of the fund is a classic lawyer-driven, judge-
supervised Rule 23 operation.
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The German Foundation is a whole different way of thinking
about dealing with the issue. It is a non-judicial fund set up with
essentially political and diplomatic efforts to run it in a non-
judicial way. I have just emerged, myself, with two interesting
personal perceptions that are obviously not empirical because they
can't be generalized, but my sense is that the class action
mechanism yields more money and yields more transparency and
yields more, at least, intense preoccupation with individuals.
Whereas the non-judicial mechanism-this mixed mechanism,
where lawyers, diplomats, all got together to make a deal-yields
less money, less concern with individuals, but much greater speed
and much more potential for lower transaction costs, lower
individualized transaction costs.
And we are going to wind up having to make choices in the
future in building these inter-systemic mechanisms to give us the
best possible resolution.
Moderator
I am gathering names to call upon after David speaks.
Mr. Vladeck
I would like to take as my starting point Judge Weinstein's
Illinois law review article, which focuses on the interaction among
the three major disciplines on the marketplace that, at least in
theory, deter tortious conduct: criminal law, regulatory law, and
the tort system itself.42 One of the insights that comes through in
Judge Weinstein's article, but which is largely undeveloped in the
academic literature, is the nature of the interaction among these
three legs of what Judge Weinstein has dubbed "our wobbly stood
of civil justice."
The point I want to begin with is descriptive: namely, that it is
wrong, given the current state of affairs, to place too much stock in
either of two legs of the stool-criminal and regulatory law-and
that to the extent the civil justice system rises or falls, it will be as
a result of refinements in the tort system. Neither the criminal law
nor the actions of our regulatory agencies provide effective
42 Weinstein, supra note 5.
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discipline on today's marketplace.
Let's begin with criminal law and ask whether criminal law
effectively deters corporate misconduct in the field of health and
safety. The answer is plainly no. The major federal workplace
safety law, the Occupational Safety and Health Act, provides for
criminal sanctions where workers are killed on the job through an
employer's willful misconduct or where an employer deliberately
falsifies records accident records.43 Thousands of American
workers die each year in industrial mishaps." Many of these
deaths are not accidents. In one high-profile case, a fifty-nine year
old illegal immigrant from Poland, who worked for a year stirring
tanks of sodium cyanide at the Film Recovery Services plant in Elk
Grove, Illinois, became dizzy from the cyanide fumes, went into
convulsions, and died of acute cyanide poisoning. OSHA inspected
the plant after the worker's death and fined the company $4,855
for twenty safety violations, but later halved the penalty when the
company objected. OSHA did not seek criminal sanctions against
Film Recovery.4 5 Unfortunately, OSHA's handling of the Film
Recovery case was not aberrational. Although the criminal
provisions of the OSH Act have been on the books for over thirty
years, they have barely been used, and no one could plausibly
4' 29 U.S.C. § 666 (2003).
44 Occupational Safety and Health Administration, U.S. Department of
Labor, OSHA Facts, at http://www.osha.gov/as/opa/oshafacts.html (last visited
Sept. 12, 2003). According to OSHA's most recent statistics, there were 5,900
worker deaths in 2001. Id.
45 Getting Away with Murder: Federal OSHA Preemption of State Criminal
Prosecutions for Industrial Accidents, 101 HARV. L. REv. 535, 543 (1987)
(detailing OSHA's half-hearted enforcement effort, and pointing out that state
prosecutors indicted the corporation and three of its top officers for murder and
obtained convictions). Illinois v. O'Neil, 550 N.E.2d 1090 (Ill. App. 1st Dist.
1990). Following the publication of the above note, the Appellate Court of
Illinois vacated the convictions and remanded for further proceedings. Id. See
also David Barstow, A Trench Caves In; a Young Worker Is Dead. Is It a
Crime?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2003, at Al; David Barstow, US. Rarely Seeks
Charges For Deaths in Workplace, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2003, at Al; David
Barstow, California Leads in Making Employer Pay for Job Deaths, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 23, 2003, at Al.
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claim that they have had a real impact on workplace safety.4 6
The story is no different under the Food and Drug Act, which
also contains criminal provisions.47  The Food and Drug
Administration, which administers the Act but is represented in
court by the Department of Justice, invokes its criminal authority
only sparingly. Part of the reason may be the reluctance of the DOJ
to bring criminal cases against corporations. Most notorious is the
DOJ's decision, over the heated objection of FDA counsel, not to
proceed with an indictment of a company that had manufactured
and sold defective baby formula, placing the babies being given
the formula at risk of long-term neurological damage and death.48
Even when the agency succeeds in persuading the DOJ to bring
criminal cases it has had difficulty obtaining convictions. The most
notable illustration is the agency's prosecution in Judge
Weinstein's home court of senior officials of the Beech-Nut
corporation, which knowingly sold apple juice for babies that was
in fact, not "juice" at all, but was simply water with sugar, corn
syrup, and food coloring in it. Although two high-ranking
company officials were convicted after a full trial, the Second
Circuit reversed their convictions and the officials were never
retried.49
46 See People v. Pymm, 563 N.E.2d 1 (1990) (noting OSHA's inaction in a
case involving industrial workers gravely injured as a result of exposure to high
levels of mercury in the manufacture of thermometers); see also Lynn K.
Rhinehart, Would Workers Be Better Protected if They were Declared an
Endangered Species?: A Comparison of Criminal Enforcement Under the
Federal Workplace Safety and Environmental Protection Laws, 31 AM. CRIM. L.
REv. 351 (1994). "OSHA has rarely used its criminal prosecution authority and
has even more rarely been successful." Id. at 359; S. Douglas Jones, State
Prosecutions for Safety-Related Crimes in the Workplace: Can D.A. 's Succeed
Where OSHA Failed?, KY. L.J. 139 (1991) (decrying the "abysmal performance
of OHSA" in prosecuting workplace crimes).
4' 21 U.S.C. § 333 (2003).
48 Philip Shenon, Agencies Split in Baby Formula Case, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
24, 1985, at A28.
49 U.S. v. Beech-Nut Nutrition Corp., 871 F.2d 1181 (2d Cir. 1989)
(reversing the convictions of two high ranking Beech-Nut officers on all but one
conspiracy count); see Leonard Buder, Ex-Beech-Nut Chief Seeks Probation,
N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 1998, at D2 (noting the jury's decision in Beech-Nut case);
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The inability of these and other agencies to effectively use the
criminal laws to punish and deter misconduct should come as no
surprise. Enforcing criminal laws against corporations is
problematic because layers of responsibility and lines of authority
are often blurred and diffused. Finding the one or two individuals
responsible for misdeeds taken in the corporation's name is hard
enough, proving that they should be held criminally liable for those
misdeeds is often impossible. And so, at least in the health and
safety context that gives rise to mass torts, the criminal law cannot
be seen as an effective deterrent.
As Judge Weinstein pointed out earlier, regulatory agencies
hold enormous promise in terms of placing effective disciplines on
the marketplace. Certainly as a matter of theory, Judge Weinstein
is right. After all, the main function of regulatory agencies is to set
and enforce rules of prospective application to prevent injuries
from occurring.
But it is evident that this promise is unmet. Much of what we
see today in court as mass tort cases-tires with treads that
separate; drugs and medical devices that do more harm than good;
and high levels of toxic substances in the workplace-are the
product of the systemic failure of our administrative state. And
there is no mystery why our regulatory agencies are ineffective in
preventing mass torts.
First, since the early days of the Reagan administration, there
have been sharp declines in the funding of regulatory agencies,
measured either by absolute numbers or as a percentage of Gross
Domestic Product. 50 As a result, the size of our health and safety
regulatory agencies has shrunk, not grown, even though the
economy has exploded and the responsibilities entrusted to the
agencies have increased. Today's regulatory agencies are ill-
equipped to carry out their statutory functions.
Consider the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA), which is responsible for regulating the automobile
Rifka Rosenwein, Beech-Nut Appeal Based on Excluded Evidence, MANHATTAN
LAWYER, Dec. 13, 1988, at 6.
50 See David Vladeck & Thomas 0. McGarity, Paralysis by Analysis: How
Conservatives Plan to Kill Popular Regulation, 22 AM. PROSPECT 78 (1995).
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industry and all that it makes-including, among other things,
occupant crash protection, airbags, fuel system safety, tire design,
and fuel economy. According to its 2003 Budget, NHTSA has a
total of 659 employees for all of its tasks, regulatory and
enforcement.5'
Not surprisingly, the agency cannot possibly keep up with
technological advances in automobile design, let alone set
standards that would force automakers to install new, safer
technology. For example, there have recently been many high-
profile cases involving car accidents with ruptured fuel systems,
leading to fires. 52 Many people have been killed or seriously
injured. Judge Weinstein might ask, why hasn't effective
regulation reduced the incidence of these horrific accidents? The
answer is hardly satisfying: NHTSA's fuel safety standards are
woefully out of date and are unlikely to be modified any time soon.
The fuel systems in today's cars are governed by the same
standards that governed government automobile purchases in 1967.
NHTSA simply adopted the standards shortly after the agency was
created in 1966 and has not revisited them since. NHTSA is well
aware that its standards are inadequate. In 1991, it conducted a
study that found that cars on the road were just as likely to sustain
fuel tank ruptures as they were in 1967. 53
Why has NHTSA failed to act in the face of this evidence?
Because it is an under-funded agency with a skeleton staff that is
outmatched by the industry it is charged with regulating-an
industry that historically has aggressively resisted regulation.54
51 Department of Transportation, Budget in Brief, Full Time Equivalent
Employment (Feb. 2002), at http://www.dot.gov/bib/fte.html (last visited Sept.
11, 2003); see also WILLIAM F. FUNK, RUSSELL L. WEAVER & SIDNEY A.
SHAPIRO, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE: PROBLEMS AND CASES
(2d ed. 2001) (reporting, based on data from 1988 through 1991, that NHTSA
had 913 employees).
52 See David Vladeck, Defending Courts: A Brief Rejoinder to Professors
Fried and Rosenberg, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 631, 638 & nn. 27-31 (2001)
(discussing NHTSA's regulatory failures in more depth).
53 See Barry Meier, Officials Did Little, Despite Report Saying U.S. Rule
Wasn't Cutting Fatal Car Fires, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1992, at A7.
54 Motor Vehicles Mfr. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 29,
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NHTSA picks its battles very carefully and has not chosen to fight
over fuel safety systems. And even when the agency seeks to push
through innovative regulation, it can be stymied by political
interventions. Over the past decade or so, rulemaking has become
highly political, with interventions (both subtle and overt) coming
from the Office of Management and Budget and other political
entities within the White House and, at times, from Congress. 55 It
was interventions like these that delayed in the installation of
airbags for over a decade.
56
Consider another example. The Food and Drug Administration
regulates 25 percent of our nation's economy. It is entrusted with
safeguarding our nation's food supply, including imported foods.
All drugs, biological, medical devices, and radiologic products are
regulated by the FDA, as are blood products, veterinary medicines,
cosmetics and dietary supplements. To accomplish this enormous
task, nationwide the agency has only 9,000 employees.57 That is
it-9,000 employees. It is no wonder that problem products, like
Fen-Phen and the Sulzer hip replacement medical device,
sometimes slip through the cracks.
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration is no
better off. It is charged with the responsibility of regulating
virtually every worksite in the nation, as well as setting standards
to protect workers from toxic substances and harmful physical
agents. According to OSHA, it protects 111 million workers at 7
million sites. 58 Yet OSHA has a staff of barely 2,300 employees,
1,123 of whom are inspectors. 59 With a staff of this size, most
49 (1983) (noting that "[f]or nearly a decade, the automobile industry waged the
regulatory equivalent of war against the airbag").
55 Thomas 0. McGarity, Presidential Control of Agency Decisionmaking,
36 AM. U. L. REv. 443, 456 (1987); see also Pub. Citizen v. Mineta, 318 F.3d
845 (2d Cir. 2003) (setting aside NHTSA rule that had been substantially
modified at the insistence of the Office of Management and Budget's Office of
Regulatory Affairs).
56 See Motor Vehicles, 463 U.S. 29.
57 See Food and Drug Administration, at http://www.fda.gov/opacom/
faqs/faqs.html (last visited Sept. 11, 2003).




employers will never see an OSHA inspector, and even the most
deadly workplace hazards go unregulated. For example, in 1993
the agency promised to regulate hexavalent chromium-a widely
used metal that is a recognized human carcinogen-calling this the
agency's highest priority. A decade later, the agency has yet to
publish even a proposed rule and admitted in court that, absent
court compulsion, "OSHA might not promulgate a rule for another
ten or twenty years, if at all. ' '6° Even were the Court to direct it to
issue a standard, the agency doubts that it will be able to complete
rule-making until 2007 at the earliest.
6
'
The point of this very brief overview is simple: These agencies
do not have the wherewithal to do their jobs effectively, and there
are significant limitations apart from resources. Most of these
agencies do not have subpoena authority. OSHA does not have
general subpoena authority. 62 Neither does the FDA nor the
NHTSA. And even when an agency musters the resources to take
protective measures, it still must run the political gauntlet through
OMB, the White House and Congress.
63
I agree with Judge Weinstein's intuition that we would get
substantial returns on our investment were we to reinvigorate our
administrative agencies. We might avoid many of the mass torts
that are plaguing our courts. But that day is a long way off. Until
agencies have the personnel, technical data, and other resources to
deal with emerging hazards; until they issue regulations swiftly
when faced with a problem requiring a solution; and until agencies
can make decisions insulated from political pressures from inside
the executive branch, from congressional committees, and from
powerful industry lobbyists, they will not fulfill their promise of
60 See Pub. Citizen Health Research v. Chao, 314 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir.
2002) (condemning the agency's delay and ordering it to expedite the rule-
making in the fact of grave risk to exposed workers).
61 Id.
62 See 29 U.S.C. § 651 etseq.
63 OMB's interference pursuant to Executive Order 12,866 (as amended by
Executive Order 13,258) may delay or derail rule-making, and through the
Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. § 801, Congress has reserved to itself the
right to overturn major regulations-a right Congress exercised in overturning
OSHA's ergonomics rule.
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providing an effective discipline on the market. Because the
rejuvenation of these two wobbly legs Judge Weinstein has
discussed appears unlikely, we have no choice but to rely on our
tort system to both deter mass torts and to compensate those
injured by them, and for that reason, the tort system must remain as
robust as possible.
So we return to the question of how to strengthen our tort
system to provide, insofar as we can, individualized justice in mass
tort settings. I share Linda Mullenix's concerns about the
procedures currently used, which are principally aimed at
enhancing the efficiency of the system. My point is that we need to
find ways to modify the mass tort system to deliver individualized




The Judge asked me if I would be prepared today to give just
some summary thoughts about the September 1 1th fund. And
having read the statutes and the regs, as many of you have, I think
that if the fund does not work properly, it won't be tried again.
And if it does work properly, it won't be tried again.
Everybody around this table understands that Congress
occasionally intercedes with a polio vaccine statute or a Price-
Anderson statute or a downwind-rancher statute or a uranium-
miner statute or a black lung statute or a September 1 lth statute.
One shouldn't read too much into these statutes in terms of
long term impact. I don't think they are a substitute, in my
experience, for anything other than, importantly, a response to a
specific unique situation.
Or to put it another way, I haven't, in the last thirty years at
least, seen any indication that De Tocqueville was wrong when he
wrote in 1840 that sooner or later every public law issue of any
importance ends up in a courtroom in the United States. And I
think that is probably still the case, for good or for ill.
So, the academic, you know, Linda will write some fabulous
articles about this, and Deborah will do some fabulous research,
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but I am dubious about the long term implications of a response to
a horrific unprecedented event.
Also, you know, it is very interesting when you read this
statute. In a way, the problem of implementing the statute is much
easier than some of the mass torts that we all are familiar with. It is
a mass claim, but it is not the type of mass claim I am used to, with
hundreds of thousands or millions of claimants.
The way the statute is drafted, it is relatively cabinized as to
how many people will claim.
Secondly, it is in large part-everything is relative-it is a
traumatic disaster. You are not going to have the toxic tort Agent
Orange causation problem that bedevils the system. That's a plus
in terms of trying to figure out a meaningful way to implement it.
I think the problem will be the emotionalism surrounding the
whole event and the statute, and the politicization that goes with it.
So you are going to have to come up with a plan that deals with
that problem of visible emotion and the political fall-out of the
statute.
In terms of some of the substantive issues-we have to have
offsets; we can't have offsets; charity should be offset; charity
should not be offset. Let's run the numbers and see if with offsets
somebody gets zero. I suggest that there is going to be a limitation
on offsets. If without offsets somebody is going to get $72 million
in economic loss through an administrative system, I suggest to
you that there is going to be some adjustment.
Judge Weinstein
Machiavelli, not Freud. What intrigues me about this statute
and experience with Agent Orange and also with asbestos is the
temporal flexibility that is required, and isn't available generally in
the law.
In Agent Orange, there was a temporal problem. We got out a
little money in order to permit the government ultimately to step in
and do what the government had to do that was right, whether it
was technically sound or not. They did the right political thing and
picked up the ball. And so the court order was just a stop gap to
permit something good to happen on the political field.
In asbestos, we have allowed a system to develop that is utterly
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debilitating to everyone. We are now in the position where in the
Manville bankruptcy, which I revised some years ago because it
was being abused, we are paying 5 percent of the value of claims
of people with mesothelioma diseases and also 5 percent of claims
of people who are just marched through these trailers and find a
little spot here and there; they are not suffering from anything. 64
Query: Can the court system, as a court of equity, respond
flexibly so that when it appears that the system set up is breaking
down, it can intervene on an equitable basis and say, "The system
we set up at first is not working. There was a final judgment, but
we are a court of equity, and we are going to take another fresh
look at it and revise it." Can we do that? Can we put such an
escape valve in the original settlement or judgment? Both sides
might balk.
And that's true in a number of other cases where we don't have
the epidemiology, or we do have it, and new information is made
available, or we think we will have it. How can we deal with
finality?
Now, in the case of this 9/11 act, you have the possibility of
doing that to some extent. We know we have about three thousand
people dead and probably about ten thousand or so who have been
injured in some way. It is quite possible for the special master to
say, look, we are not going to look at the New York statute--death
statute-where the guy or gal on the 105th floor who was going to
make $100 million probably and leave it to a spouse, we are not
going to give them 100 million times more than the Guatemalan
immigrant who will probably not be able leave a penny to a
spouse. Zip for one and $100 million for the other? Forget about
the New York tort law. It is not going to work.
We can say immediately we will give everybody in the family
64 See Frank J. Macchiarola, Manville Personal Injury Settlement Trust:
Lessons for the Future, 17 CARDOZO L. REv. 583 (1996); Illinois Municipal
Periodicals, Lamb That Roared, at http://www.lib.niu.edu/ipo/im890515.html
(discussing Manville bankrupcty); Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act of
2003, S. 1125, Hearing Before Senate Judiciary Comm., 108th Cong. (2003)
(statement of Sen. Chuck Hagel), available at http://www.litigationdata




of the person who died $100 thousand. Come in. Fill out the form.
Here is your check. If you had this injury, you get this. So, that's
payment one.
We don't know what your final payment is going to be because
society hasn't decided how we are going to handle this thing-
what the appropriate equities are. So, we are going to appoint
commissions or a special master, and in a year or two, we are
going to be able to make a second payment-whatever it will be-
based on as a new rationale.
That seems to me to make some sense in many mass tort cases.
It would take care of the changes in not only evidence, but also in
sensitivity with respect to what the compensation should be.
That can be done in asbestos. That's the advantage of an
administrative agency-even a quasi administrative court
supervised agency-which can change the rules over the years.
Why do we have to be fixed in our judgment, which is one of
the characteristics of the tort system? You get your judgment.
Everybody is bound and you go on.
But that doesn't apply in many mass torts where you have such
a general changing community interest, as well as, a lot of
individual interests, and when you have changing targets with
respect to the science, with respect to how people feel about these
things, with respect to the availability of the principle and how it
should be applied.




The question I have is whether this legislation is a useful
substitute for a mass tort class action. The short answer is it's not;
it doesn't promote deterrence or insurance objectives-it's a waste
of money that surely could be allocated to more important social
uses. It is buying out these tort claims, much as the Price Anderson
65Act was read by the Supreme Court to buy out the tort system.
65 See 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (2003); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina
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And so we ask ourselves, is this a good substitute for mass tort
class action?
And then, we have to ask ourselves what would we want the
tort system to do? And again, I come back to the starting point,
because people have made such a big point of it, do we want the
tort system to deliver compensation to redress people's loss?
And I think we are going to find out a good deal about what
people lose in these kinds of situations because there is elimination
of collateral source-of the standard collateral source rule in this
legislation. We are going to find out just how much insurance
people actually had because coverage like life insurance will be
subtracted from recoveries they get under the 9/11 fund.
We know that most people, that 84 or 85 percent of the people
have first party insurance from commercial suppliers and the rest
of the people are covered by various forms, and the first group,
too, are covered by various forms of government insurance for
catastrophic losses, my statement is that the 9/11 fund is a waste of
money.
There is no need for compensation. People have been injured
terribly, but their injuries do not have any different effects on
families of victims from the effects of the injuries that take place
on the Major Degan Highway every day. Death is death and
disability is disability-and the resulting turmoil, suffering, and
disruptions to lives and livelihood are generic consequences of
these awful events. We are and should be concerned that
dependents have insurance to replace catastrophic losses regardless
of the cause. From a compensation point of view-putting aside
the rationale of buying out tort claims-when people have
adequate insurance they should not receive any special payout
because of the cause of loss, 9/11 or otherwise. If we think people
don't have adequate insurance, then it's inadequate in general, not
just for 9/11 or any specific risk. Apparently, judging from the
estimated total payout under the 9/11 fund, Congress has $5 or $6
billion extra that could be devoted to catastrophic loss coverage.
Everyone would have been far better off had Congress allocated
that sum to increase coverage under social security and other
Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 84 (1978).
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government insurance programs, including FEMA.
And so, again, I come back to the fact that the tort system
shouldn't do it, and this substitute for it shouldn't do it.
What would we want? Again, I come back to the idea that the
tort system's basic rationale would be deterrence. If we are going
to substitute the tort system, then we want effective deterrents.
How would that be achieved? Well, it won't be achieved if the
money is going to come out of the public treasury, which is what is
going to happen here. We are not charging the airlines. We are not
charging the security agencies. We are not charging the architects.
We are not charging the owner of the buildings about the design
and so forth that might have created the risks. We aren't charging
New York City for allowing 110 story buildings that could be a
security risk.
Oh, you say, well, wait a minute, it is a foregone conclusion
that we would want 110 stories. Maybe it is-if people are willing
to pay for it. The only way you can find out whether they are
willing to pay for those risks is to impose the costs on the people
who are constructing the risky enterprise. It is a harsh hard way of
thinking, but if you want a sensibly run society, you will have to
think that way.
And for the government to bail out potential tort defendants,
which is what this is doing, you are running the risk that our
society is not controlling the risks we most desperately want to
control.
Now let me just extend this further point. Deterrence is the
only rational social objective for the tort system, but I don't think
that all of us involved in the system-judges, lawyers, jurors,
academics-have adequate training and resources to do the kind of
hard analysis required for effectively thinking through and solving
the problems of how best to control risk. Special masters and other
experts can be hired to assist the lawyers, judges, and other
decision makers, but if they truly have uncommon knowledge and
skills, then how will the inexpert assess their expert advice? We'll
have to hire experts to do the assessments, and then to monitor this
work, we'll have to hire another set of experts.
We are in desperate, near intellectually bankrupt situation.
So, when I talk about deterrence it is with a big qualification.
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The legal system as presently constituted can't do the work of
devising and implementing effective means of managing accident
risks in a socially responsible fashion. I agree with the point Peter
Shuck made: courts and the tort system are primarily justified as a
check and balance against the power and potential for slacking,
self-dealing and perfidy in other social as well as governmental
institutions. Inevitably, we will pay a high price for having this
mixed system. The cost can be reduced substantially, however, by
devoting the resources to training those who oversee the tort
system in the theories and methods of effective social problem
solving and policymaking, in particular, in controlling accident
risk. It's a task for the law schools, which so far have failed society
abysmally.
Judge Weinstein
Deterrence, deterrence. It is a shibboleth. I see it every day in
my criminal court. I see it in the civil court. There is no indication
of any deterrent. The deterrents, with respect to September 1 lth in
searching baggage, was nonexistent. Every one of the baggage
searchers continued to do exactly what they did. Deterrence isn't
going to do it.
If the government steps in and says the system didn't work, we
will do it now in a different way, that may work. But deterrence? I
would like to see studies of the deterrence in the criminal or civil
systems.
Every ten years, I get the same group of new people who were
just let out of jail, who are committing the same crimes with
respect to housing here and abusing federal funds. And I don't
think anybody has suggested that the tort law has any deterrent
effect. Have there been such studies, Professor Hensler?
Professor Hensler
There is no good evidence that the tort system deters bad
behavior, and there is lots of good reason to think that it would not
because of all of the characteristics that we have discussed here.
The deterrence theory is based on a set of assumptions about
the link between a decision and its outcomes. And if that link





Well, because we are going to have to break for lunch at 1:15,
I've got a group of people here I know have asked to speak and
Sheila is the next one.
Ms. Birnbaum
Let me just say, Judge, I think that if we had a system-you
can go back to the Manville bankruptcy, perhaps-I think, in your
equitable powers and redistribute the money that is left.
Moderator
The money that is left in the trust now?
Ms. Birnbaum
Yes, I think you can do that. Well, we can talk about that. But
the answer is that wouldn't really solve any problem except in the
Manville Bankruptcy.
The fact is that unless there is some legislation, what you do
only affects one defendant who is already in bankruptcy and
doesn't affect all the other thousands of cases, hundreds of
thousands of cases in all kinds of state courts because no one sues
in a federal court for asbestos anymore, in which they are not
going to follow Judge Weinstein, even if he has the right approach
because they will do what Helen Freedman was just talking about.
They will make sure the people in West Virginia, are going to get
as much as they can as soon as they can and the hell with people in
the rest of the country.
So unless there is some nationalization, unless there is some
real dramatic change as a result of legislation, we will not resolve
these issues.
I think Ken is absolutely right that this is a one time situation,
based on a horrendous act that no one was really responsible for in
the end.
I would like to just raise one other issue. I am pessimistic that
we will see real reform. We will likely make changes around the
edges. For example, we will create more transparency in class
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action settlements.
The problem is that we have created through the mass tort
system what I would call institutionalized victimization.
Everybody has become a victim. Everybody who ever took a
product that has been recalled becomes a victim. And, in fact, the
problem is that people really believe they are victims because their
lawyers and others tell them they are victims.
I am not talking about the cases that present political issues
such as the litigation involving the Swiss banks and the Holocaust,
I am talking about the every day mass torts that arise when a
product is recalled especially drugs and devices. That's where most
of the mass tort litigation have occurred and continue to occur.
Every recall has the potential to become a mass tort.
So, Judge, I wish some of your ideas could catch on. I think in
fact, in the state courts, few of these ideas are being implemented.
But this is a tort litigation system that needs a great deal of




I hear you, Professor, when you talk about deterrents, and
whether or not the bar and judiciary are the appropriate
mechanisms to impose or at least even oversee risk management.
But I say to you from a practical experience, there are a group of
people out there who feel they are perfectly capable to exercise
risk management and have. And that is the corporations. They will
sit there and they will make the determination as to whether or not
with the foreknowledge that there is a risk involved, to take that
risk.
I remember in the congressional hearings when they were
asking the chairman of Exxon whether or not they foresaw the
possibility that there would be a disaster of the magnitude of the
Exxon Valdez and he said, yes, and we determined to take the risk.
Well, that's very nice, except the people that paid for that risk
weren't asked if they were willing to assume that risk.
Also, these same companies will then measure what the
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economic loss is. They take that risk as opposed to proceeding on
an individual basis through separate litigation to literally protract
the ability of each individual victim to receive justice, as opposed
to right now saying, "Okay, I made a mistake. I am going to offer
restitution or disgorgement or compensation to those that I hurt en
masse because there was a mass wrong."
They will make that determination if we don't. So rather than
deterrents in risk management, I look at this as a matter of
accountability. If we permit companies or individuals to assume
the right to basically take the risk or avoid the risk-a risk that
they don't pay unless they are held accountable-if we don't
impose through the judicial system the concept of accountability,
then what do we do other than foster lawlessness?
People then can act the way they want, take whatever risk they
want to impose on others, and then have no liability other than
through a political system which is set up to hear conflicting
interests of special groups or an administrative body which is
principally set up to establish sets of minimum standards or sets of
rules of minimum behavior.
Are you really saying that because you don't like the quality of
the justice that's available through the judicial system then there




The September I Ith program is clearly not a substitute for
mass tort litigation generally. The reason the model is important is
that if the program is judged to work well, then it leaves open the
possibility when there is a consensus that the tort system is not
doing the best job in a mass injury case, that we could consider
another option.
Moderator
Where we are now is that we have about ten minutes left and
then we have lunch. And I have Professor Schuck, Professor
Berger, Mr. Goldberg and Mr. Vladeck. I really want to give Jack
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Weinstein word.
Professor Schuck
I will try and be brief. I want to make two points that may seem
incompatible, and then explain why I think they are perfectly
compatible and then make an institutional point.
The first point is that Deborah Hensler is absolutely right.
Everything we know about the tort system suggests that we really
don't know how much deterrence the tort system produces.
In some areas it may be relatively significant, maybe in
products liability. In other areas, it is probably minimal or non-
existent, such as in automobile accidents. But we don't really
know. She is absolutely right about that.
The second observation is that there is enormous deterrence out
there. Take 9/11. There have been more than thirty years of
terrorism without a single incident like this. You can't simply look
at 9/11 and say, "Well, the system broke down and, therefore, there
is no deterrence." You can't just look at the criminal justice system
and say as Judge Weinstein just did, "All these people come before
me as recidivists and they have committed crimes, so there is no
deterrence."
There are lots of deterrents out there but tort law is not
probably a major one. Criminal law, I suspect, is a major deterrent,
as is the regulatory system and market incentives and other
incentives in the case of 9/11. These deterrents help explain why
for thirty years there has been terrorism, but there have been no
incidents like this.
Now, to the institutional point, one of the reasons why I don't
want judges, even judges as brilliant and as just as you, making
broad public policy is that you see a very, very narrow part of the
world from the bench. You see the criminals that come before you
and infer that they are representative of the larger world. You don't
see the people who are deterred by the criminal law and don't
commit crimes. You see the people who are brought before you.
Similarly, you see the accidents that occur, and you don't see
the non-accidents that were deterred by the legal system and other
deterrents. You see a very small part of the world and you do your
job as well as it could possibly be done, but your perception is
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systematically and institutionally distorted. Everybody around the
table agrees that you do it as well as it can be done. But you still
have an institutionalized narrow view of the world, and public




I wanted to return for a moment to the articles on combining
administrative, criminal, and tort law 66 and relate them to two of
the real issues with tort law that we haven't quite dwelled on, and
that is the compensation scheme that exists under tort law and the
attorneys' fees that exist under tort law, both of which we've been
tangentially referring to.
I think the value of looking at the criminal and the
administrative schemes, though there are lots of other problems
that come up, is that maybe it would cause us to rethink a little
what compensation ought to be in these tort cases. We perhaps
need a much narrower, narrower scheme, and we need to think it
through, as well as the attorney's role in producing these awards.
Another problem is that we have a shift in the heads of
administrative agencies every time we have a new election, and we
have a politicized administrative scheme and a department of
justice that is more politicized than what we see in the judiciary.
And I see that as adding a new layer of problems, that one has
shifts in policy, that are far greater than what happens in the court
system.
But I think that for other reasons we really should take a
stronger look as to whether there are things one could get out of
these other systems in terms of remedies and allocation of
resources that we need to pay attention to.
Moderator
Professor Goldberg.
66 Weinstein, supra note 5.
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Professor Goldberg
One way to think about the intersection of these areas of law is
as a three-legged stool. Or, better, the question is whether we
believe the stool really has or should have three legs, whether
there's a distinct role for criminal, regulatory, and tort law to play.
What I haven't heard yet from the judge is why tort law is
different from administrative law or criminal law. In his view, tort
looks like the third leg of the stool, the bigger leg, the stronger leg,
because it is not just tort law in the conventional sense of
identifying a responsible wrongdoer but also administrative law
and criminal law already rolled into it as a kind of super leg.
And so I think we need to think harder about or distinguish two
sets of questions. One is what do you want tort law to do as a
distinctive institution, if anything? And once we have isolated that
question, then there is an entirely separate set of questions, which
is should there be other institutions besides tort law, because tort
law doesn't do a very good job of certain things?
If we conceive of tort law as an institution for redressing
wrongs or whatever you want to call it, it may be that it actually
does that pretty well. It also may be that it needs modification to do
it well with respect to modem torts. It may be that we need to
rethink not just causation but what the definition of a wrong is. For
example, it may be a corporate wrong not to disclose information,
as Margaret Berger, has suggested, in which case the wrong is
complete upon the nondisclosure.
But that's still within the conception of tort law as redressing a
wrong. Now, that system may be terrible at deterring. It may be
terrible at compensating people systematically and equally, but that
doesn't mean we should take tort law and make it into something
else, which has been the instinct of every academic that has studied
tort law in the twentieth century. Rather, it may suggest that we
ought to let tort law do what it does well, and then develop other
modes of law, regulatory, whatever, which can do the jobs that we
want the law to do, not tort law, but the law.
Moderator
Mr. Vladeck you have the last comment and then Judge
Weinstein you wrap up for us.
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Mr. Viadeck
I will be brief. I just want to respond to the implication that has
been raised on a number of occasions-namely that the rise of "no
injury" mass tort cases is the responsibility of the plaintiffs' bar.
That suggestion is myth, not fact. And to understand why, it is
important to distinguish between cases involving cognizable
injuries, like asbestosis, and those cases seeking "medical
monitoring" or other forms of relief, not because the plaintiffs are
currently suffering injury, but instead because the plaintiffs have
been exposed to a dangerous substance and therefore are at risk of
developing serious illness.
67
I agree that it is the plaintiffs' bar that has pressed asbestosis
cases, but those are cases in which the worker is suffering injury,
albeit in many cases the injury is slight. And I recognize that those
cases are problematic where insurance-poor or thinly capitalized
defendants end up depleting their assets to pay off these claims
rather than claims from workers suffering from mesothelioma,
lung cancer or severe asbestosis.
But I disagree with the idea that it was the plaintiffs' bar that
pushed the exposure-only cases. Insofar as I know, exposure-only
cases were the invention of the defense bar and that the plaintiffs'
bar, at least initially, had to be bludgeoned into taking them on.68
After all, resolving exposure-only cases benefits defendants at least
as much as, if not more, than plaintiffs' lawyers. What defendants
seek in mass tort cases is to purchase as much res judicata as they
can at the lowest price possible. Exposure-only settlements often
permit the defendant to substitute what is invariably an
inexpensive insurance policy for the tort system. That is what
triggered the phenomena of exposure-only cases. Fortunately, the
67 Compare Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. Ayers, 537 U.S. 807 (2003)
(holding workers suffering from asbestosis may bring suit under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act) with Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley,
521 U.S. 424 (1997) (holding disease-free asbestos exposed workers may not
sue under FELA for medical monitoring).
68 See Ortiz v. Fibreboard, 527 U.S. 815, 824-25 (1999) (detailing the
history of the Fibreboard settlement and the fact that defendants, not plaintiffs,
pressed for the inclusion of the exposure-only plaintiffs).
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Supreme Court's rulings in AmChem and Ortiz have dampened the
enthusiasm for exposure-only settlements. 69 But I believe it is
revisionist history to blame them on the plaintiff's bar.
Moderator
Judge Weinstein, I would like to let you close.
Judge Weinstein
I will need another eighty years to reflect on what you, my
learned and dear colleagues, have said today. Thank-you.
My closing for now is the same as the opening with respect to
at least tort law. The big advantage of tort law, as I see it, is that in
general you have an attorney who holds the hand of the person
who feels injured. And that aspect of law seems to be particularly
important in the kind of world we are getting into, where people
feel disassociated--cut off from the mainstream-where you have
so many people and where much of the political system finds itself
incapable of dealing with these problems.
To know that you have somebody competent who will fight for
you and treat you with the dignity you feel you need under the
circumstances of your hurt, seems to me a critical aspect of the
work of the legal profession.
Attorneys have begun to solve these problems even in these
mass cases. In DES, they had TV cassettes that they send out.
70
There are organized plaintiffs' committees. There are e-mails.
There are meetings with the court and with others. There are
attorney hotlines.
I am skeptical about deterrence. I am skeptical about
compensation. I am even skeptical about reliance on rules of
evidence or procedure.
But I do believe that the American lawyer serves a vital
function as learned friend of all of these millions of people out here
who are bereft of any possibility of protecting themselves and
finding some solace on their own in the law and in our present
69 See id.; Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
70 See Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924 (1980); see also In re DES
Cases, 789 F. Supp. 548 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
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society.
Moderator
Well, that's a very, very fitting way to end today. I want to
thank you and all of the participants for a wonderful session. I
really think we had a great conversation. Thank-you.

